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Abstract
Ordinal peer grading has been proposed as a simple and scalable solution for computing reliable
information about student performance in massive open online courses. e idea is to outsource the
grading task to the students themselves as follows. Aer the end of an exam, each student is asked to
rank — in terms of quality — a bundle of exam papers by fellow students. An aggregation rule then
combines the individual rankings into a global one that contains all students. We dene a broad class
of simple aggregation rules, which we call type-ordering aggregation rules, and present a theoretical
framework for assessing their eectiveness. When statistical information about the grading behaviour
of students is available (in terms of a noise matrix that characterizes the grading behaviour of the aver-
age student from a student population), the framework can be used to compute the optimal rule from
this class with respect to a series of performance objectives that compare the ranking returned by the
aggregation rule to the underlying ground truth ranking. For example, a natural rule known as Borda is
proved to be optimal when students grade correctly. In addition, we present extensive simulations that
validate our theory and prove it to be extremely accurate in predicting the performance of aggregation
rules even when only rough information about grading behaviour (i.e., an approximation of the noise
matrix) is available. Both in the application of our theoretical framework and in our simulations, we
exploit data about grading behaviour of students that have been extracted from two eld experiments
in the University of Patras.
1 Introduction
Educational platforms such as Coursera and EdX provide easy access to high level education to everyone
who has a decent Internet access. At the end of 2018, these platforms had more than 101 million users —
essentially, students aending the oered courses — and this number is expected to further increase in the
near future. e term “massive open online course”, or simply MOOC, is very descriptive of the service
these platforms oer. A MOOC is the result of their partnership with a faculty member in a top university,
whose role is to design the course and organize the course material so that it takes advantage of the most
popular Internet apps that the platform utilizes. Courses oered include literally everything.
∗A preliminary version of this paper appeared in Proceedings of the 17th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC),
pages 323–340, 2016. is work has been partially supported by a PhD scholarship from the Onassis Foundation, and by the
European Research Council (ERC) under grant number 639945 (ACCORD).
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Even though the service provided is certainly useful, the viability of MOOCs will strongly depend on
their revenue sources. Currently, investments from VCs have secured their survival for a short term, but
their long term success requires a more stable business model. A feature that could be the main source
of revenue for MOOCs is the so-called veried certicate which the students can get at a reasonable cost.
e veried certicate keeps information about the performance of a student in a course (or in a chain of
courses) and can be used to justify a student’s quality to potential employers. So, the veried certicate
should have reliable information about the student performance in the courses she has participated in. Even
though the means to guarantee this in the traditional University system is well-established, achieving this
in a MOOC is a challenge.
e big issue is in the massive student participation. Of course, the Internet provides tools so that
organizing exams with huge numbers of students is logistically feasible. But what about assessment and
grading? As the most popular courses aract 50 000 students or more and the vision of MOOCs enthu-
siasts is for millions of students per course, is grading of assignments or exams possible? Undoubtedly,
professional graders would be extremely costly. Organizing the material using multiple-choice questions
and answers that could be graded automatically cannot be an option when the students are asked to pre-
pare an essay or a formal mathematical proof or express their critical thinking over some issue. Grading
is a typical example of a human computation [Law and von Ahn, 2011] task in these cases.
e only solution that seems consistent to the MOOCs vision is known as peer grading [Kulkarni et al.,
2013; Piech et al., 2013;Walsh, 2014], according to which the grading task is outsourced to the students that
participated to the exam themselves. is approach has been already implemented in some MOOCs, and
standalone experimental tools such as crowdgrader.org [de Alfaro and Shavlovsky, 2014], peer-
grading.org [Raman and Joachims, 2014], and our own co-rank1 [Caragiannis et al., 2016] are
already available. Even though the approach seems straightforward, there are subtle implementation is-
sues. For example, allowing the students to use cardinal scores is problematic, since they participate both
in the exam and in grading and they may have incentives to assign low grades in order to improve their
personal relative performance. Even if we assume that they grade honestly, their experience in doing so is
very limited and the result will most probably be unreliable.
In this paper, we focus our aention on ordinal peer grading, which has recently received aention
in the AI and machine learning community [Caragiannis et al., 2015; Raman and Joachims, 2014; Shah
et al., 2013]. Following the seing that we considered in our previous work [Caragiannis et al., 2015], each
student gets a bundle of a small number (our favourite number that we have extensively used recently is
6) of exam papers so that each exam paper is given to the same number of students. Each student has to
rank the exam papers in her bundle (in terms of quality) and an aggregation rule will then combine the
(partial) rankings submied by the students and come up with a nal ranking of all exam papers; this will
be the grading outcome.2 Information about the position of a student in the nal ranking (e.g., top 10%
out of 33 000 students) can be included in her veried certicate.
In our previous related work [Caragiannis et al., 2015], we formally proved that a simple aggrega-
tion rule, inspired from Borda’s rule from social choice theory [Brandt et al., 2016], recovers correctly an
expected fraction of 1 − O(1/k) of the pairwise relations in the underlying ground truth ranking, when
bundles of size k are used and students make no mistakes when grading. e assumption for a ground
truth and the comparison of the grading outcome to it is similar in spirit to recent approaches that combine
1Available at co-rank.ceid.upatras.gr.
2We remark that ordinal peer grading has also been used —in a smaller scale— in the evaluation of proposals for research
funding, e.g., by the Sensors and Sensing Systems (SSS) program of NSF in 2013 [Hazelrigg, 2013], using a Borda-like method
proposed earlier by Merrield and Saari [2009]; see also [Kurokawa et al., 2015].
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voting and learning [Azari Souani et al., 2014; Braverman and Mossel, 2008; Caragiannis et al., 2016, 2014;
Chierichei and Kleinberg, 2014; Conitzer and Sandholm, 2005; Lu and Boutilier, 2014; Mao et al., 2013;
Pivato, 2013; Xia, 2014; Xia and Conitzer, 2011; Young, 1988]. e new aspect in [Caragiannis et al., 2015],
as well as in the current paper, the recent paper of our group [Caragiannis et al., 2019], and the papers by
Shah and Wainwright [2017], de Weerdt et al. [2016], and Wauthier et al. [2013], is the relaxed require-
ment of recovering the ground truth only approximately. Simulation results in [Caragiannis et al., 2015]
show that Borda has very good performance in an imperfect grading scenario inspired by a noisy model
of generating random rankings that has been proposed by Mallows [1957]. Note that, unlike other studies
[Gao et al., 2016; Raman and Joachims, 2014; Shah et al., 2013], we investigate the potential of applying
ordinal peer grading exclusively, without involving any professionals in grading.
We remark that theoretical analysis in [Caragiannis et al., 2015] requires to handle with extra care
dependencies between several random variables that appear due to the distribution of exam papers to
bundles. e analysis of Borda was possible only due to its particular denition; until the current paper,
we had not managed to extend the analysis to any other aggregation rule. Also, the O notation in the
theoretical guarantee for Borda above hides large constant terms that constitute the bound of theoretical
interest only. We follow a dierent approach here. We would like to develop a “theory” for determining
the performance of Borda with the highest possible accuracy and, more importantly, extend our study to
more aggregation rules.
We dene and study a large class of simple aggregation rules, which we call type-ordering aggregation
rules. A type-ordering aggregation rule determines the position each exam paper has in the nal rank-
ing, based only on the ranks each paper has in the bundles that contain it. is class includes Borda. We
present a theoretical framework for assessing the performance of each member of this class with respect
to a series of performance objectives. A crucial step in our study is that we have completely neglected
the dependencies between the random variables that make the rigorous analysis dicult. is sacrice
of mathematical rigor is formally incorrect but makes sense (a rigorous proof is given in appendix) when
the number of students tends to innity; this can be justied by the massive participation in MOOCs. But
the best justication of our approach is that the theoretical predictions of performance are experimen-
tally shown — through extensive simulations — to be exact. is apparently means that the dependencies
between random variables have no positive or negative impact on performance. Furthermore, once (sta-
tistical) information about the grading behaviour of students and the desired performance objectives are
known (both in specic formats, which are introduced later in Section 3), our framework can serve as an
optimization toolkit for selecting the optimal type-ordering aggregation rule. is requires an exact solu-
tion to an instance of the feedback arc set problem which, albeit NP-hard in general [Alon, 2006], can be
solved exactly for the instances that do arise.
Our theoretical framework allows us to obtain a series of results. For example, we establish that Borda is
the optimal type-ordering aggregation rule when students act as perfect graders. is is rather surprising,
since Borda is among the simplest aggregation rules in the class we consider. Even though it was not
observed to be optimal in any other scenario we considered, its performance is always close to optimality.
Furthermore, as mentioned above, the optimization task of deciding the optimal aggregation rule strongly
depends on the information about grading behaviour. We study how inaccuracies of this information
aect the choice of the optimal aggregation rule and its performance for the Mallows model as well as for
a simple random utility model [Azari Souani et al., 2012]. e results suggest a very minor impact and,
essentially, a tiny sample of a student population is enough for building a fairly accurate model of grading
behaviour.
Overall, our approach combines theory, simulations, and experimentation and is presented graphically
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in Figure 1. e lower chain of the gure describes what one would expect from a simulated exam. ere
is a student population and some of them participate in an exam. e preparation level of the students
that determines their performance in the exam is a random variable following a uniform probability dis-
tribution. Aer the exam, each student acts as the grader of a small number of exam papers submied by
other students. e grading performance typically depends on the preparation level as well. e grades
are combined using the aggregation rule and the nal ranking is compared to the ground truth to come
up with the observed performance.
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simulated 
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Figure 1: A graphical overview of our approach.
e most interesting part of Figure 1 is the upper chain. First, a eld experiment can be used to extract
information about the student population. We have performed such eld experiments with students in our
home institution; we describe them in detail and present the collected data later in the paper. ese data
are used to build noise models which, together with the desired performance objective, are given as input
to the optimization engine. e optimal aggregation rule for the particular scenario is then constructed,
and a theoretical prediction about the performance the rule is expected to have is reported. e optimal
aggregation rule can also be applied to the grades from our simulated exams (hence, the downward arrow
in Figure 1) and a comparison of the theoretically predicted performance with the observed performance
of the simulated exam can validate our theory.
e rest of the paper is structured as follows. We beginwith a description of the basic tasks that support
ordinal peer grading and related preliminary denitions and notation in Section 2. e type-ordering
aggregation rules and our theoretical framework are presented in Section 3. e eld experiments and
the validation of our framework are then presented in Section 4. We conclude in Section 5 with a short
discussion on future research directions.
2 Preliminaries
We assume that n students have participated in an exam and have submied their exam papers. Our
approach to ordinal peer grading has three distinct tasks: the distribution of papers to students, the grading
task by each student, and the aggregation of the grades into a nal result. We describe these tasks in detail
here and give denitions that will be useful later.
2.1 Distributing the exam papers
All students that participated in the exam will have to participate in grading as well. e goal of the rst
task is to balance their grading load. is is done by distributing (copies of) each paper to the students
so that each exam paper is given to exactly k students and each student receives exactly k (distinct) exam
4
papers. e k papers that a student receives form her bundle. ese are the exam papers which the student
has to grade. Crucially, the bundle of a student should not contain her own exam paper.
A k-regular bipartite graph G = (U, V,E) with n nodes on each side of the bipartition (called bundle
graph) can be used to represent the distribution of exam papers to students. Each node of sets U and V
represents a student. An edge of the graph G between a node u ∈ U and a node v ∈ V indicates that the
exam paper of the student corresponding to node u is in the bundle of the student corresponding to node
v. e restriction on the degree of the nodes of set U means that each exam paper is given to exactly k
students and the restriction on the degree of the nodes of V means that all bundles have size k.
In [Caragiannis et al., 2015], we considered bundle graphs that satisfy a particular structural property,
namely they contain no cycle of length 4. is was a technical constraint, required only in theoretical
analysis. Simulation results in that paper indicate that uniformly random k-regular bipartite graphs are
almost as good as bundle graphs. ese are the bundle graphs we consider in the current work. A random
k-regular graph can be built as follows. Starting from the complete bipartite graphKn,n with node sets U
and V , rst remove the edges between nodes corresponding to the same student in U and V . en, draw a
perfect matching uniformly at random among all perfect matchings ofKn,n that do not include previously
removed edges. e edges in the k perfect matchings obtained by repeating the above step k times form
the bundle graph.3
2.2 Modelling the grading task
roughout the paper, we assume that there is an underlying strict ranking of the exam papers, the ground
truth, which we aim to recover. As it will shortly become apparent, the seing we consider is so restrictive
that we should not expect to recover the ground truth exactly. Instead, we aim to recover the ground truth
approximately.
A restriction of our seing is that each student is given only k exampapers to grade. Another restriction
is that the grading task for each student is simply to rank the exam papers in her bundle, in decreasing order
of quality. We consider dierent scenarios for the grading behaviour of the students. In a rst scenario,
we assume that, aer the end of the exam, the instructor announces indicative solutions and gives detailed
instructions that the students can use during grading. Here, we assume that students will act as perfect
graders. Admiedly, this is an unrealistic assumption but we include it as an extreme case in our study
together with many others.
In a second scenario, we assume that the students receive no solutions or grading guidelines by the
instructor aer the end of the exam. In this case, students will inevitably make mistakes when grading
and it is reasonable to assume that the performance of a student in grading is strongly correlated to her
preparation level and her performance in the exam. We will use the term imperfect grading to refer to this
scenario.
In the study of imperfect grading scenarios, we will consider student populations with dierent char-
acteristics. In the rst such population, each student has a quality drawn uniformly at random from the
interval [1/2, 1], which aects her position in the ground truth and her ability to grade as well. e ground
truth is the ranking of the students in decreasing order of quality. A student b of quality q performs the
grading task as follows: she considers every pair of exam papers x and y in her bundle, such that x appears
ahead of y in the ground truth, and temporarily determines x b y with probability q and y b x with
3Equivalently, we can start fromKn,n, obtain k perfect matchings (by selecting each of them uniformly at random among all
perfect matching ofKn,n that do not include edges that have been included in previous matchings), and then rename the nodes
in one side of the bipartition so that no student is assigned a bundle that contains her exam paper. is alternative process is used
in our formal analysis in Appendix B.
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probability 1− q; the pairwise relation b will evolve into her ranking of the exam papers in her bundle.
If, aer considering all pairs of exam papers in the bundle, the pairwise relation b is cyclic, the whole
process is repeated from scratch. Otherwise, the ranking of the exam papers in the bundle induced by b
is the grading outcome of student b. Due to its similarities with the well-known Mallows model [Mallows,
1957] for generating random rankings, we refer to this grading behaviour as Mallows grading.
In another interesting type of student population, grading behaviour follows the general structure of
random utility models in the literature; e.g., see Azari Souani et al. [2012]. Each student has a quality
drawn uniformly at random from the interval [0, 1]. e ground truth is again dened as the ranking of
the students in decreasing order of quality. A student b of quality q performs the grading task by assigning
a score to every exam paper x of quality qx in her bundle as follows: with probability q she sets the score
of x equal to qx and with probability 1− q the score is drawn uniformly at random from the interval [0, 1].
en, the ranking of the exam papers is computed by sorting them in non-increasing order of these scores.
We use the term RUM grading to refer to this grading behaviour.
e two paragraphs above describe how the behaviour of populations of Mallows and RUM graders is
simulated in the experiments that we discuss in Sections 4.2 and 4.3. Admiedly, these two populations
are very stylized. We will introduce two more in Section 4.1, which are closer to the grading behaviour of
real students.
2.3 Aggregation rules
e third important task is to aggregate the partial rankings provided by the graders into a nal output
ranking. is is done using an aggregation rule. A simple but very compelling aggregation rule is inspired
by the Borda count voting rule. In our context, Borda computes a score for each exam paper by examining
the positions it has in the rankings of the graders that have this exam paper in their bundles. A rst position
by an exam paper contributes k points to its score, a second position contributes k − 1 points, and so on.
e outcome of Borda is a ranking of the exam papers in non-increasing order in terms of their Borda
scores. When we use Borda, we assume that ties are broken uniformly at random but other tie-breaking
schemes could be considered as well.
In our previous work [Caragiannis et al., 2015], we also considered several other aggregation rules such
as a rule that we call Random Serial Dictatorship (RSD) as well as rules that are based on appropriately
dened Markov chains, motivated by early work on rank aggregation on the web [Dwork et al., 2001;
Page et al., 1999]. RSD is very slow in the computation of the nal outcome and, even though it performs
remarkably well with perfect graders, it has a poor performance in simulated exams with Mallows graders.
We will not consider it in the current paper; actually, applying it with input from 10 000 graders, which
is the typical scenario we consider in this paper, is a computational challenge. e aggregation rules that
are based on Markov chains were dened in an unsuccessful aempt to distinguish between high and low
quality graders and put more weight on the partial rankings of the former. ese ideas are not considered
in this work either.
Raman and Joachims [2014] use optimization (stochastic gradient descent) methods that yield aggre-
gation rules which are maximum likelihood estimators with respect to the cardinal scores of exam papers
that are supposed to be part of the ground truth. Since we assume that the ground truth is just a rank-
ing of all exam papers, such methods are not applicable in our case. Instead, we focus on much simpler
aggregation rules.
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3 Type-ordering aggregation rules and their theoretical analysis
We will use the term type to refer to the grading result for an exam paper. Its type consists of the ranks
the exam paper gets from the k graders that have it in their bundles. So, the type is a vector of k integers
from [k] = {1, 2, ..., k}. We follow the convention that the k entries in types appear in monotone non-
decreasing order. We use
Tk = {σ = (σ1, σ2, ..., σk)|1 ≤ σ1 ≤ σ2 ≤ ... ≤ σk ≤ k}
to denote the set of all types for bundle size k. It is not hard to see that Tk contains
(
2k−1
k
)
dierent types.
As an example with k = 6, an exam paper of type (1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 5) is ranked rst by one of its graders,
second by four graders, and h by one grader. Now, consider another exam paper of type (2, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3)
and observe that Bordawould give the same Borda score of 28 to both exam papers. Is there some particular
reason for which these two exam papers should be very close in the nal ranking? Now, consider the two
types (1, 1, 1, 2, 5, 6) and (2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3) of Borda scores 26 and 27, respectively. Borda indicates that an
exam paper with the second type is beer. But looking carefully at the ranks, we could come up with
the following interpretation. e rst exam paper is very good (and most probably in one of the two top
positions in any bundle) and the two low ranks are due to poor judgement by the graders. In contrast, the
second exam paper is just above average and this is reected in all grades. Of course, such interpretations
are valid only when they can be supported by information about the graders (e.g., about the frequency with
which they make mistakes). But, certainly, there are cases where such interpretations are indeed valid.
So, it seems that Borda is restrictive; then, one would think that this is due to the particular scores
that Borda uses. We will not investigate whether dierent scores could yield beer results. is, in a
slightly dierent context, is the subject of another recent paper of our group [Caragiannis et al., 2019].
Instead, we will dene a much broader class of aggregation rules. A type-ordering aggregation rule uses a
strict ordering  of the types in Tk. en, the nal ranking of the exam papers follows the ordering  of
their types, breaking ties uniformly at random. In general, rules of this class seem to be very powerful.
Compared to Borda which partitions the set of exam papers into only k2 − k + 1 dierent scores, a type-
ordering aggregation rule can distinguish between exponentially many (in terms of k) dierent types. In
the following, we use the term Borda ordering to refer to any ordering of the types in non-increasing order
of Borda score. We also use B(σ) to denote the Borda score of an exam paper with type σ = (σ1, ..., σk).
Clearly, B(σ) =
∑k
i=1 (k + 1− σi) = k2 + k −
∑k
i=1 σi.
We remark that the use of types in the denition of a broad class of aggregation rules has been possible
due to the regularity that we imposed on the bundles and the distribution of exam papers to them. Of
course, this creates issues related to the theoretical analysis of these rules (such as dependencies between
the random variables involved in the distribution to bundles and in grading). In the next section, we
discuss how to overcome such issues by making several simplifying assumptions. A (much more involved)
rigorous analysis that justies these assumptions is presented in Appendix B.
3.1 A framework for theoretical analysis
For the analysis of type-ordering aggregation rules, we will assume an innite number of students. is is
close to the vision of MOOCswith huge numbers of enrolled students and is the important assumption that
constitutes the theoretical analysis possible. So, the positions of students in the ground truth ranking can be
thought of as occupying the continuum of the interval [0, 1] with uniform density. We will usually identify
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an exam paper as a real number x ∈ [0, 1], i.e., by its rank in the ground truth ranking.4 Furthermore, we
will assume that in each of the k bundles to which exam paper x belongs, the remaining k − 1 exam
papers are selected uniformly at random with replacement from the student population. Our assumption
of innitely many students allows us to ignore subtleties such as the requirement that all students in a
bundle should be distinct and also dierent than the student that acts as the grader of the bundle (the
probability that this requirement will not be satised in some bundle is zero).5
In our theoretical modelling of imperfect grading, we make further simplifying assumptions. In par-
ticular, we ignore the fact that grading behaviour is correlated to student quality, and instead assume
independence of the two characteristics. e ground truth is selected uniformly at random among all pos-
sible rankings of all students. Equivalently, this can be thought of as selecting independently the quality of
each student uniformly at random from a given interval, and then sorting the students in non-increasing
order in terms of these qualities. Grading behaviour of the students is independent of quality. When a
student receives a bundle of exam papers, she draws a random ranking of them according to a probability
distribution that characterizes the grading behaviour of all students participating in the exam. In partic-
ular, the behaviour of each grader is characterized by a k × k noise matrix P = (pi,j)i,j∈[k], where pi,j
denotes the probability that the exam paper with correct rank j among the k exam papers in a bundle is
ranked at position i by the grader.
Clearly, a noise matrix is doubly stochastic, i.e., the sum of the entries in any column and any row is
equal to 1. Observe that the corresponding noise matrix for perfect grading is the k × k identity matrix.
We will oen use the term noise model as a synonym of the term noise matrix. Note that a noise matrix
provides only aggregate information for all students of a population. Furthermore, this information is
actually rough, as it is not hard to see that a doubly stochastic matrix may correspond to many dierent
probability distributions over rankings.
Consider an aggregation rule that uses an ordering  of the types dened by bundles of size k and is
applied to partial rankings provided by graders whose behaviour follows the noise model P . Let us focus
on computing the expected number of pairwise relations in the ground truth ranking that are correctly
recovered in the outcome of the rule. It suces to consider every pair of exam papers x, y ∈ [0, 1] with
x < y (i.e., exam paper x has a beer rank in the ground truth compared to exam paper y) and add one
point if x has a beer type than y according to the ordering , and half a point if both exam papers
have the same type. In this last case, the tie is resolved uniformly at random and the probability that the
correct pairwise relation will be recovered is 1/2. Hence, denoting byC the expected6 fraction of pairwise
relations recovered by the rule (we will rene this notation in a while), and by xB σ the event that exam
paper x gets type σ aer grading, we have
C =
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
x
 ∑
σ,σ′:σσ′
Pr[xB σ and y B σ′] + 1
2
∑
σ
Pr[xB σ and y B σ]
 dy dx
4Notice that the interval [0, 1] is used only to represent the rank of a student and not some kind of absolute cardinal quality.
In our analysis, the only information we infer from two students with ranks x and y with x < y is that x is beer than y; we
make no additional assumption about the dierence in quality between the two students. is comes in contrast to assumptions
by Raman and Joachims [2014], who assume that cardinal scores are part of the ground truth as well.
5Admiedly, this analysis is non-rigorous. A formal analysis should assume a nite number of students, take into account
all dependencies between random variables that we neglect here, and conclude that these dependencies vanish as the number of
students approaches innity. Such a rigorous analysis is presented in Appendix B.
6Here, the expectation is taken over the randomness in the assignment of exam papers to bundles, in the student grading, as
well as in the resolution of ties.
8
=
∑
σ,σ′:σσ′
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
x
Pr[xB σ and y B σ′] dy dx+ 1
2
∑
σ
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
x
Pr[xB σ and y B σ] dy dx
e rst sum runs over all pairs of dierent types σ, σ′ of Tk with order σ  σ′ and the second sum runs
over all types. e scary (at rst glance) double integral can be hidden under the notation W (σ, σ′) to
obtain
C =
∑
σ,σ′:σσ′
W (σ, σ′) +
1
2
∑
σ
W (σ, σ). (1)
We will use the term weight to refer to the quantityW (σ, σ′). Our assumption for an innite number of
students nullies any dependencies between the types that exam papers x and y get aer grading. So, the
events xB σ and y B σ′ are independent and the denition of the weightW (σ, σ′) becomes
W (σ, σ′) =
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
x
Pr[xB σ] · Pr[y B σ′] dy dx. (2)
Let us now compute the probability that exam paper x gets type σ = (σ1, ..., σk). By considering all
ways to distribute the entries of the type vector as ranks of an exam paper by the graders that handle it
(ignoring symmetries), there are
N(σ) =
k!
d1! · ... · dk!
ways that the exam paper can get type σ, where di is the number of graders that have the exam paper
ranked i-th. Again, due to our assumption for innitely many students and the uniform inclusion of them
into bundles, the quality of each exam paper included in a bundle does not aect the quality of other exam
papers (in the same or dierent bundles). Clearly, the grading by dierent students is performed without
dependencies either. Denoting by E(x, σi) the event that exam paper x is ranked σi-th in a bundle, the
probability that x is of type σ is
Pr[xB σ] = N(σ)
k∏
i=1
Pr[E(x, σi)].
To compute Pr[E(x, σi)], it suces to consider all possible true ranks that exam paper x may have in a
bundle and account for the probability of having such a rank and being ranked σi-th by the grader that is
handling the bundle. Let us denote by E∗(x, j) the event that the true rank of x in a bundle is j. en,
Pr[xB σ] = N(σ)
k∏
i=1
k∑
j=1
pσi,j Pr[E∗(x, j)].
Now, the probability Pr[E∗(x, j)] is equal to the number of ways we can choose j − 1 exam papers to
be ahead of x, times the probability that all of them will indeed be ahead of x in the bundle, times the
probability that the rest k − j exam papers in the bundle will have true ranks worse than j. We use Lk
to denote the set of all k-entry vectors ` = (`1, ..., `k) with `i ∈ [k] and, for compactness of notation, we
abbreviate
∑k
i=1 `i by |`|1. We have
Pr[xB σ] = N(σ)
k∏
i=1
k∑
j=1
pσi,j
(
k − 1
j − 1
)
xj−1(1− x)k−j (3)
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= N(σ)
∑
`∈Lk
k∏
i=1
pσi,`i
(
k − 1
`i − 1
)
x`i−1(1− x)k−`i
= N(σ)
∑
`∈Lk
( k∏
i=1
pσi,`i
(
k − 1
`i − 1
))
x|`|1−k(1− x)k2−|`|1 , (4)
where the second equality is obtained by exchanging the sum and product operators. Using the fact that
(1− x)m = ∑mj=0 (mj )(−1)jxj form = k2 − |`|1, we obtain
Pr[xB σ] = N(σ)
∑
`∈Lk
( k∏
i=1
pσi,`i
(
k − 1
`i − 1
))
x|`|1−k
k2−|`|1∑
j=0
(
k2 − |`|1
j
)
(−1)jxj
= N(σ)
∑
`∈Lk
k2−|`|1∑
j=0
( k∏
i=1
pσi,`i
(
k − 1
`i − 1
))(
k2 − |`|1
j
)
(−1)jx|`|1−k+j . (5)
Interestingly, Pr[xB σ] is a univariate polynomial of degree k2− k. en, the double integral in equation
(2) can be computed analytically. e computation is tedious but straightforward; see Appendix A.
3.2 Computing optimal type-ordering aggregation rules
e approach in Section 3.1 suggests a general way of evaluating the performance of any type-ordering
aggregation rule. In order to compute the expected number of correctly recovered pairwise relations, it
suces to use equations (1), (2), and (5). Equation (5) can be used to obtain Pr[xBσ], which is then used in
equation (2) to compute the weights (for any possible pair of types σ and σ′). Finally, equation (1) returns
the expected number of correctly recovered pairwise relations.
Of course, the expected number of correctly recovered pairwise relations is not the only performance
objective one would like to measure. For example, we could simply ignore exam papers that are very close
to each other in the ground truth ranking. e ground truth ranking is mostly a modelling assumption
and it should not be very restrictive in the evaluation of an aggregation rule. So, we could just measure
the expected number of correctly recovered pairwise relations between pairs of exam papers with ranks
in the ground truth that dier by at least a% (for small values such as 5%). Another possibility would
be to ignore pairwise relations between pairs of exam papers that have both very low rank in the ground
truth. For example, why is it important to recover correctly the pairwise relation between the students
that have true ranks 80% and 95%? A general objective in this direction would be to measure the correctly
recovered relations between pairs of exam papers that involve one with true rank in the top a% (e.g., 20%).
Our theoretical framework can be easily extended to handle such cases using many dierent per-
formance objectives. In general, a bivariate performance objective is dened by a bivariate function
f : [0, 1]2 → [0, 1] which returns the importance of measuring a correctly recovered relation between
two students x and y with x ≤ y. In the presentation of our framework in Section 3.1, we have assumed
such a function with f(x, y) = 1 for every pair of students. e two scenarios of the previous paragraph
can be captured by the function (i) f(x, y) = 1 when y − x ≥ a% and f(x, y) = 0 otherwise, and (ii)
f(x, y) = 1 when x ≤ a% (and x ≤ y) and f(x, y) = 0 otherwise. Many other performance objectives
can be dened including ones in which the function f returns fractional values between 0 and 1.
e only modication in the computation of Section 3.1 is in the computation of the weights which
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should now become
W (σ, σ′) =
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
x
f(x, y) · Pr[xB σ] · Pr[y B σ′] dy dx. (6)
In order to capture the generality of the scenarios considered, we overload the notation for the performance
measure C to specify the bundle size k, the aggregation rule, the noise matrix P describing the grading
behaviour, and the bivariate performance objective f .
eorem 1. Consider a type-ordering aggregation rule  that is applied on k-sized partial rankings from
an innite population of students with grading behaviour that follows a noise matrix P . en, the fraction of
correctly recovered pairwise relations that satisfy the performance objective given by the bivariate function f
is
C(k,, P, f) =
∑
σ,σ′:σσ′
W (σ, σ′) +
1
2
∑
σ
W (σ, σ), (7)
whereW (σ, σ′) is given by (6) and Pr[xB σ] is in turn given by (5).
Note that the weights do not depend on the aggregation rule at all. ey depend on the grading
behaviour and the bivariate performance objective. Instead, the aggregation rule determines only the
particular weights that should be summed up in order to compute C(k,, P, f). is means that, once
we have information about the bundle size, the grading behaviour, and the desired bivariate performance
objective, we can seek for the type-ordering aggregation rule that is optimal for this particular scenario.
All we have to do is to compute the type-ordering aggregation rule that maximizesC(k,, P, f) which,
actually, translates to computing an ordering of the types so that the lemost summation in the denition
(7) is maximized.
It is not hard to see that the problem is equivalent to solving a maximization variant of the feedback arc
set (FAS) problem. On input a complete directed graph G = (V,E,w) with non-negative edge weights,
the objective of FAS is to nd an ordering  of the nodes of G such that∑u,v:uv w(u, v) (i.e., the total
weight of “consistently directed” edges with respect to) is maximized. In our case, the input is a complete
directed graph that has a node for each type σ ∈ Tk. A directed edge from a node corresponding to type
σ to a node corresponding to type σ′ has weightW (σ, σ′). e next statement should now be obvious.
eorem 2. Computing the optimal type-ordering aggregation rule for a scenario involving an innite pop-
ulation of students, specic bundle size, grading behaviour, and desired bivariate performance objective is
equivalent to solving feedback arc set on an edge-weighted complete directed graph.
FAS is NP-hard even in its very simple variant on unweighted tournaments [Alon, 2006]. e particular
weighted version we consider here admits a PTAS [Kenyon-Mathieu and Schudy, 2007]. Unfortunately, the
solutions that such a PTAS can guarantee in reasonable time are quite far from optimality and the resulting
type-ordering aggregation rule will consequently have highly suboptimal performance. Fortunately, the
FAS instances that we had to solve in order to compute optimal rules have a very nice structure for all the
scenarios considered. is structure allows us to compute the optimal FAS solution (almost) exactly by a
straightforward algorithm that we present in the following. We strongly believe that this nice property
holds in any scenario that can appear in practice.
Let us assume that we would like to solve FAS on an edge-weighted complete directed graph G =
(V,E,w) and to compute an ordering of the nodes of V so that the total weight of edges in the direction
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that is consistent to the ordering is as high as possible. First observe that if two opposite directed edges
have the same weight, the ordering of its endpoints does not aect the contribution of the consistently
directed edge. So, the decision about the relative order of such non-critical node pairs can be postponed
until the very end of the algorithm and any decision about them will be just ne. Now, consider two nodes
u and v of G such that w(u, v) > w(v, u); then, the consistently directed edge that we would like to have
in the nal solution is (u, v). We will call such pairs of nodes critical pairs. Decisions about the ordering
of critical pairs of nodes have to be taken rst. An ideal situation would be if aer deciding the critical
node pairs, we came up with a partial ordering of all nodes that participate in at least one critical pair. e
ordering could then be completed by appropriate decisions about non-critical node pairs. And, luckily,
this process would have resulted in an optimal solution for FAS since every pair of nodes would have the
maximum possible contribution to the objective. Of course, things are not as easy in general since the
decisions about critical pairs may lead to cycles of nodes, which cannot be part of the nal ordering.
Our algorithm proceeds as follows. It takes as input an edge-weighted complete directed graph G =
(Tk, E,W ) with Tk as the node set and weight W (σ, σ′) (computed using (6)) for every directed edge
from type σ to type σ′. Our algorithm builds an auxiliary unweighted directed graph H = (Tk, A) again
over the types. For every critical pair of types σ, σ′ with W (σ, σ′) > W (σ′, σ), the auxiliary graph has
a directed edge from type σ to type σ′. e next step is to compute all strongly connected components
of H ; two types σ and σ′ belong to the same strongly connected component if H contains a directed
path from σ to σ′ and a directed path from σ′ to σ. is computation is easily performed by computing
breadth rst search trees rooted at every node of H . Aer this step, the ordering of the types in dierent
strongly connected components is irrevocably decided. In order to decide the ordering of types within
the same strongly connected component, we use brute force on the corresponding subgraph of G. If the
size of a strongly connected component is so large that brute forcing is prohibitive, we just order the
types within the component according to a Borda ordering (breaking ties uniformly at random). As a nal
straightforward step, we decide the order of non-critical node pairs.
e approach to use Borda ordering when brute forcing is very costly in terms of running time, might
give the impression that the outcome of the above algorithm is always very close to a Borda ordering.
Surprisingly, our algorithm returns Borda orderings (or orderings that are very close to Borda) very rarely.
One such situation is presented in the next section where we show that Borda is indeed the optimal type-
ordering aggregation rule in all scenarios that involve perfect graders. For imperfect graders, brute forcing
has been proved extremely useful as the vast majority of strongly connected components are small. We
report statistical information from the size distribution of strongly connected components in Section 4 (see
Table 1 in Section 4.2).
3.3 Borda is optimal for perfect graders
We will now exploit our theoretical framework to obtain our rst concrete result.
eorem 3. For every scenario that involves an innite population of perfect graders, specic bundle size, and
a bivariate performance objective, Borda (with any tie-breaking rule) is the optimal type-ordering aggregation
rule.
Proof. Assume that we have a scenario with a bundle size of k, perfect grading (i.e., a k× k identity noise
matrix), and the bivariate function f that represents the performance objective.
We rst compute the probability that exam paper x gets type σ using (3) and the fact that pσi,` = 1 if
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σi = ` and pσi,` = 0 otherwise. Hence,
Pr[xB σ] = N(σ)
k∏
i=1
(
k − 1
σi − 1
)
xσi−1(1− x)k−σi
= N(σ)
(
k∏
i=1
(
k − 1
σi − 1
))
xk
2−B(σ)(1− x)B(σ)−k.
Now, consider two exam papers with ranks x and y in the ground truth such that x < y and let σ and
σ′ be two types. Using the above equality, we obtain
Pr[xB σ] Pr[y B σ′]
Pr[xB σ′] Pr[y B σ] =
(
y(1− x)
x(1− y)
)B(σ)−B(σ′)
. (8)
Since y > x, it is also 1− x > 1− y and the right hand side of the last equation is above, equal, or below
1 if and only if the quantity B(σ)−B(σ′) is positive, zero, or negative. Hence, the quantity
Pr[xB σ] Pr[y B σ′]− Pr[xB σ′] Pr[y B σ]
and the Borda score dierence B(σ) − B(σ′) between the two types σ and σ′ have the same sign. Now,
let sgn : R→ {−1, 0, 1} be the signum function. We have that
sgn
(
W (σ, σ′)−W (σ′, σ))
= sgn
(∫ 1
0
∫ 1
x
f(x, y)(Pr[xB σ] Pr[y B σ′]− Pr[xB σ′] Pr[y B σ]) dy dx
)
= sgn
(
B(σ)−B(σ′))
is implies that any Borda ordering  of the types maximizes the quantity ∑σ,σ′:σσ′W (σ, σ′) and,
consequently, the quantity C(k,, I, f); the theorem follows.
e statement ofeorem 3 is rather surprising as Borda is among the simplest type-ordering aggrega-
tion rules. For example, when k = 6, Borda classies the exam papers into only 31 dierent levels (based
on their Borda scores) while there are type-ordering rules that exploit a more rened classication of the
papers into 462 dierent levels; the gap is much higher for larger values of k. eorem 3 essentially says
that this extra power is not at all necessary and Borda is always the best choice when perfect grading is
used.
4 Validation of our framework
In this section, we present our eld experiments and simulation results that validate the theoretical frame-
work we developed in Section 3.
4.1 Building realistic noise models using eld experiments
We have run two eld experiments with the students that aended the course on Computational Com-
plexity in the Department of Computer Engineering and Informatics of the University of Patras during the
Spring 2015 and Spring 2016 semesters. is is a course that the rst author teaches during the last few
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years and usually includes an optional mid term exam. As it is typically the case in Greek universities,
cardinal integer and half-integer scores between 0 and 10 are used in such exams and they represent how
correct the answers of the students to the exam questions are. Hence, these cardinal scores represent the
success of the students in the exam in absolute terms.
In our experiments, our goal has been to investigate how eective the students can be in ordinal grad-
ing. For this purpose, we created hypothetical exams with three questions and prepared several answers
for them. In particular, for the 2015 experiment, we prepared 16 dierent answers to question 1, 12 an-
swers to question 2, and 8 answers to question 3. Combinations of these answers into all dierent ways
resulted in a pool of 1536 dierent exam papers. We created bundles of size 6 from this pool. Each student
was given a bundle of exam papers which was asked to rank (for a bonus grade). Note that the selection
of papers in each bundle was not arbitrary. e answers for the questions belonged to dierent levels
of correctness and included excellent ones, almost excellent ones with a minor issue not fully resolved,
answers in the right direction but with sloppy write-up, completely incorrect answers, no answer at all,
etc. Specically, we had 7, 6, and 5 dierent levels of correctness for the answers in questions 1, 2, and
3, respectively. For the 2016 experiment, these numbers were only slightly modied. When bundles were
formed, we imposed the following constraint for any pair of exam papers A and B in a bundle: if the
correctness level of paper A in an answer is strictly higher than that in paper B, then paper B cannot
have a strictly higher correctness level than A in any other answer. Furthermore, there was at least one
question for which the answers (in A and B) had dierent levels of correctness. is guaranteed a strict
ranking of the exam papers in each bundle and, furthermore, that this ranking would be well-dened and
independent of any assumptions about the importance of the dierent questions.
In this ranking exercise, each student was given a bundle of 6 exam papers and returned a ranking of
them. In addition, the students participated in the traditional mid term exam. is allowed us to quantify
the correlation between their grading behaviour and their success in the traditional exam. So, the outcome
of each experiment is a list consisting, for each student, of a ranking of the exam papers in her bundle (as
a permutation of the correct ranking) together with her performance in the exam. ese data are depicted
in Tables 8 (for the 2015 experiment), 9, and 10 (for the 2016 experiment) in Appendix C. Figures 2(a)
and 2(b) show the correlation between grading error (Kendall-tau distance of the ranking returned by
each grader from the correct ranking of the exam papers in her bundle) and quality for the 136 and 241
students that participated in the mid term exams in 2015 and 2016, respectively. Observe that, in 2015,
the grading performance of the majority of the non-excellent students seems to be uniformly distributed
between average and excellent, with just a few under-performing outliers, whereas the picture is more
clear in 2016 and the grading performance has improved. An explanation for this grading behaviour is
that, even though the students have participated in many exams like the mid term in the past and have a
very good idea of what they are expected to do, in 2015, it was the very rst time they were asked to rank.
In contrast, before the 2016 exam, we made the data we collected in the previous year available in order to
help the students prepare for the ordinal grading task as well.
For comparison, we have also ploed this correlation for randomly chosen students for theMallows and
RUM populations in Figures 2(c) and 2(d). Both gures show data about 200 students as a representative
number in between the number of participants in the two eld experiments. For the Mallows population,
the correlation between student quality (to be thought of as equivalent to the success in the traditional
exam) and grading performance is clear. However, for the RUM population, the correlation seems to be
more noisy.
e data depicted in Tables 8, 9, and 10 have been used extensively in simulated exams with two
“realistic” populations. Essentially, each student in the corresponding experiments serves as the support
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Figure 2: Correlation between (cardinal) grade of students in the traditional exam and grading error
(Kentall-tau distance from the correct ranking). Data refer (a) to the 136 students that participated in our
eld experiment in 2015, (b) to 241 students that participated in our eld experiment in 2016, (c) to 200
random students/graders drawn from the Mallows distribution, and (d) to 200 random students/graders
drawn from the RUM distribution. Each bubble corresponds to a number of students that is proportional
to its area. e data in (a) and (b) have been obtained by processing the data in Tables 8, 9, and 10.
of the distribution of the grading behaviour of the realistic populations. For sampling students from these
populations, we draw pairs (consisting of a ranking of exam papers and the corresponding quality) from
the tables uniformly at random and independently, with the quality values slightly perturbed (randomly)
so that a strict ground truth ranking of the sampled students is obtained.
e information about the grading behaviour of students in our two experiments has also been distilled
into the noise matrices
P2015 =

0.4632 0.2573 0.1029 0.0588 0.0588 0.0588
0.2059 0.3162 0.2279 0.1103 0.0662 0.0735
0.1617 0.1912 0.2574 0.2059 0.1324 0.0515
0.1029 0.1176 0.1912 0.2426 0.2794 0.0662
0.0441 0.0661 0.1397 0.2206 0.3015 0.2279
0.0221 0.0514 0.0808 0.1618 0.1618 0.5221
 (9)
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and
P2016 =

0.6224 0.2199 0.0788 0.0373 0.0124 0.0290
0.1826 0.4896 0.1867 0.1037 0.0249 0.0124
0.0664 0.1494 0.4647 0.1992 0.0788 0.0415
0.0664 0.0664 0.1411 0.4315 0.2116 0.0830
0.0456 0.0498 0.0913 0.1618 0.4730 0.1784
0.0166 0.0249 0.0373 0.0664 0.1992 0.6556
 (10)
which are used when applying our theoretical framework. We will use the terms realistic 2015 and realistic
2016 to refer to the noise model represented by matrices P2015 and P2016, respectively. e information
in the matrices was obtained by measuring the frequency that the i-th ranked exam paper by students
should be correctly ranked at position j. For example, in 2015, 28 out of 136 students ranked third an
exam paper in their bundles which should have been ranked fourth; thus, cell (3, 4) in P2015 contains the
value 28/136 ≈ 0.2059.
We have also implemented the two processes that deneMallows and RUM graders (see Section 2.2) for
bundles of size 6, and use them in simulations. By sampling 109 Mallows and RUM students with uniform
qualities and simulating their grading behaviour, we have computed the corresponding noise matrices
Pmallows =

0.6337 0.1753 0.0824 0.0494 0.0339 0.0253
0.1753 0.5112 0.1549 0.0768 0.0479 0.0339
0.0824 0.1549 0.4865 0.1500 0.0768 0.0494
0.0494 0.0768 0.1500 0.4865 0.1549 0.0824
0.0339 0.0479 0.0768 0.1549 0.5112 0.1753
0.0253 0.0339 0.0494 0.0824 0.1753 0.6337
 (11)
and
Prum =

0.5046 0.1587 0.0963 0.0824 0.0793 0.0788
0.1587 0.4048 0.1709 0.1026 0.0836 0.0793
0.0963 0.1709 0.3746 0.1732 0.1026 0.0823
0.0824 0.1026 0.1732 0.3746 0.1709 0.0963
0.0793 0.0836 0.1026 0.1709 0.4048 0.1586
0.0788 0.0793 0.0824 0.0963 0.1586 0.5046
 (12)
e noise matrices P2015, P2016, Pmallows, and Prum are used in the computation of the optimal type-
ordering aggregation rules for the corresponding student populations according to the methodology de-
veloped in Sections 3.1 and 3.2. We stress again that these noise matrices do not include any information
about the correlation between the grading behaviour and the quality of the student that acts as grader.
is is a feature that our theoretical framework completely neglects. In contrast, this correlation is im-
plemented in our simulations. Surprisingly, as we will see in the next section, our theory leads to very
accurate performance predictions, in spite of its several simplifying assumptions compared to practice.
4.2 On the accuracy of theoretical performance predictions
We have applied the theoretical framework that we developed in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 in order to obtain the
optimal type-ordering aggregation rules for several scenarios together with theoretical predictions regard-
ing their performance. In all scenarios, we use the same bundle size of k = 6 and distinguish between the
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realistic 2015, the realistic 2016, the Mallows, and the RUM noise models by using the corresponding ma-
trices P2015, P2016, Pmallows and Prum dened in equations (9), (10), (11) and (12), respectively. As bivariate
performance objectives, we have considered the following:
• all2all: the total number of all correctly recovered pairwise relations. e corresponding bivariate
function is dened as f(x, y) = 1 for x, y ∈ [0, 1] with x ≤ y and f(x, y) = 0 otherwise;
• th-10% and th-50%: the total number of correctly recovered relations between pairs that include
an exam paper that is ranked in the top 10% and top 50% in the ground truth, respectively, i.e.,
f(x, y) = 1 if x ≤ 0.1 and x ≤ 0.5 and x ≤ y, respectively;
• acc-2% and acc-5%: the total number of correctly recovered relations between pairs with positions
that dier by at least 2% and 5% in the ground truth, respectively, i.e., f(x, y) = 1 if y − x ≥ 0.02
and y − x ≥ 0.05, respectively.
For each scenario, we use (6) and (5) to compute the weight W (σ, σ′) for every pair of types σ and
σ′ from T6. en, following eorem 2, we solve the corresponding instance of FAS (as described in Sec-
tion 3.2) to compute the type-ordering aggregation rule that is optimal (of course, under the simplifying
assumptions of our theoretical framework) for the particular scenario. e theoretical prediction of per-
formance is then given by (7) from eorem 1.
Computations required for the application of our theoretical framework (i.e., those described in Ap-
pendix A for the computation of the weights as well as the FAS algorithm described in Section 4.2) have
been automated. All the computational results that we report in the following have been obtained using
an Intel 12-core i7 machine with 32Gb of RAM running Windows 7. Our methods have been implemented
in C using the GNUMultiple Precision Arithmetic Library (GMP) and in Matlab R2013a. In particular, high
precision is absolutely necessary in order to compute the weights even for bundles of size 6 since, by in-
specting equations (6) and (5) carefully (see also Appendix A for a detailed discussion on the computation
of the weights), we can see that there are products with more than 30 factors and factorials of integers up
to 30 that are involved in the computations.
In all scenarios we have considered, the algorithm for solving FAS is fast. is is due to the fact that
the strongly connected components have small size. In all cases, among the 462 dierent types that we
can have for bundles of size 6, more than 97% of them form singleton components and the maximum
component size never exceeded 50 (for the RUM model). Brute forcing has been used to order the types in
strongly connected components of size up to 10. For larger components, Borda orderings have been used
as described in Section 3.2. e distribution of the strongly connected components for the scenarios we
considered is depicted in Table 1.
In parallel to the application of our theoretical framework (see again Figure 1 which summarizes our
overall approach), we have also performed extensive simulations for all scenarios considered. For each
scenario, we have simulated exams with 10 000 students (as explained in Section 4.1), using the optimal
type-ordering aggregation rule, that was obtained by applying our theoretical framework for the scenario,
as discussed above. Tables 2 and 3 contain the average values (from 1000 simulated exams) of the per-
formance measure for each simulated grading scenario in columns labelled as “simulation”. e columns
labelled “theory” contain the theoretical performance predictions for the same aggregation rule and sce-
nario. Data for perfect grading scenarios are reported in Table 3, where Borda is the optimal type-ordering
aggregation rule.
In contrast to the simplifying assumptions of our theoretical framework, correlation of grading be-
haviour and performance in the exam is a key feature in our simulations. erefore, the information
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size 1 3–7 8–11 ≥ 12 max
realistic
2015
all2all 448 13 1 0 10
th-50% 460 2 0 0 3
acc-2% 449 12 1 0 10
acc-5% 451 10 1 0 10
realistic
2016
all2all 458 4 0 0 5
th-50% 460 2 0 0 3
acc-2% 458 4 0 0 5
acc-5% 460 2 0 0 4
mallows
all2all 453 6 2 1 20
th-50% 459 3 0 0 4
acc-2% 449 10 2 1 20
acc-5% 449 12 0 1 20
rum
all2all 443 10 2 7 50
th-50% 448 11 2 1 17
acc-2% 439 14 4 5 50
acc-5% 435 16 10 1 50
Table 1: Distribution of the size of strongly connected components. Results about th-10% are not shown;
curiously, all strongly connected components are singletons in these cases.
contained in Tables 2 and 3 is rather surprising and shows that, in spite of our assumptions, our theory
provides extremely accurate predictions for the performance of type-ordering aggregation rules in prac-
tice. Note that the values in Tables 2 and 3 are percentages and we never observed dierences beyond the
second decimal point between the theoretically predicted value and the simulated one.7 Also, note that the
number of 10 000 students in our simulations is much lower than the vision for the most popular courses
that will be oered by MOOCs in the near future; the predictions become even more accurate for higher
numbers of students.
Borda has been used in all imperfect grading scenarios for comparison purposes. e optimal type-
ordering aggregation rule can have a performance that is 3.5% beer than Borda (e.g., in the th-10% sce-
nario with RUM graders). However, in many cases, Borda is closer to optimality.
Figure 3 reports detailed information for all simulations, for the all2all, th-10% and acc-5% scenarios.
Clearly, the performance of the aggregation rules for all objectives that we considered is sharply concen-
trated around the average values shown in Tables 2 and 3; note that the size of the x and y-axis that are
depicted in all subgures are at most 3% wide (besides in subgure 3(k) for RUM grading with the th-10%
bivariate performance objective, which has axes that are 6% wide). Again, Borda is used for comparison
purposes.
A nal comment on the performance of the optimal type-ordering aggregation rules is that they are
extremely robust. Even though they have been optimized with respect to a particular bivariate performance
objective, they perform very well with respect to other objectives as well. Figure 4 shows measurements of
7Even though we have consistently used exams with 10 000 students in all our simulations, data with smaller exams are also
very close to the theoretically predicted values. For example, in simulations with 1000 exams with 1000 students in the realistic
2016 grading scenario with the all2all performance objective, the optimal rule and Borda have average performance percentage of
85.76 and 85.07, compared to 85.69 and 85.02 in Table 2. Higher dierences are observed for much smaller exams (respectively,
86.23 and 85.55 for 100-student exams).
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Figure 3: Performance of the optimal type-ordering aggregation rule and Borda for the realistic 2015, 2016,
Mallows and RUM grading scenarios for the all2all, acc-5%, and th-10% objectives. Each point (among the
1000 points in each cloud) corresponds to a simulated exam with the participation of 10 000 students with
the corresponding grading behaviour.
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noise realistic grading 2015 realistic grading 2016
seing theory simulation theory simulation
method opt borda opt borda opt borda opt borda
all2all 80.01 79.57 80.09 79.57 85.70 85.02 85.69 85.02
th-10% 87.61 87.18 87.60 87.17 91.71 90.02 91.69 90.01
th-50% 83.62 83.43 83.62 83.43 88.64 88.06 88.63 88.06
acc-2% 81.27 80.73 81.27 80.74 87.08 86.39 87.08 86.38
acc-5% 82.97 82.42 82.97 82.42 89.01 88.31 89.01 88.30
Table 2: Performance of optimal type-ordering aggregation rules as well as Borda for the two realistic
grading scenarios of 2015 and 2016 with respect to the ve dierent objectives. e values presented
are theoretical predictions (theory) and average simulation measurements from 1000 exams with 10 000
students.
noise perfect grading mallows grading rum grading
seing theory sim. theory simulation theory simulation
method borda borda opt borda opt borda opt borda opt borda
all2all 92.01 92.02 85.15 84.38 85.16 84.39 77.89 76.79 77.89 76.81
th-10% 96.94 96.95 92.05 90.52 92.07 90.54 87.11 83.59 87.13 83.62
th-50% 94.13 94.14 88.39 87.8 88.4 87.81 81.27 80.32 81.28 80.33
acc-2% 93.57 93.57 86.52 85.72 86.52 85.73 78.99 77.85 78.99 77.86
acc-5% 95.47 95.47 88.42 87.61 88.42 87.62 80.57 79.40 80.57 79.41
Table 3: Performance of optimal type-ordering aggregation rules as well as Borda for scenarios with per-
fect, Mallows, and RUM grading with respect to the ve dierent objectives. e values presented are
theoretical predictions (theory) and average simulation measurements from 1000 exams with 10 000 stu-
dents.
properties that cannot be expressed as bivariate performance objectives. Each plot shows data about Borda
and the optimal (under the all2all objective) type-ordering aggregation rules in scenarios with perfect,
realistic, Mallows, and RUM grading. Borda in the perfect grading scenario has the best performance with
respect to these objectives as well. Actually, its performance in this scenario can serve as the optimistic
barrier for every type-ordering aggregation rule in any (imperfect) grading scenario. More interestingly,
Borda has performance that is very close to the optimal rule for realistic grading (the corresponding curves
almost coincide in Figures 4(a) and 4(c)) and is slightly worse for Mallows and RUM grading. In fact, these
results are in sync to those in Tables 2 and 3, and Figure 3.
4.3 e eect of inaccuracies in the noise model
e two realistic noise models that we built in Section 4.1 are, by denition, approximations of the students
in our home institution. Besides limitations that have to do with our modelling assumptions, they have the
obvious drawback that they have been built using a very small fraction of our students, i.e., 136 students
in 2015 and the slightly increased number of 241 students in 2016. So far, the reader should have been
convinced that the type-ordering aggregation rules we have built are indeed optimal for a large population
that inherits the quality and grading performance of this small fraction of students; this has been the focus
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Figure 4: Robustness of optimal type-ordering aggregation rules and Borda with realistic graders in Subg-
ures (a), (b) and (c), and perfect, Mallows, and RUM graders in Subgures (d), (e) and (f). e information
depicted is the result of 1000 executions on exams with 10 000 participating students. Displacement: a
point (x, y) represents the fact that y% of the students have been displaced by at least x% from their true
position. Interval displacement: a point (x, y) represents the fact that y% of the students in the interval
[0, x%] are the same both in the ground truth and in the rankings produced by the aggregation rules.
Distribution of top 20%: a point (x, y) represents the fact that y% of the top 20% of the students are
positioned in the interval [(x− 5)%, x%].
of the application of our theoretical framework and of our simulations with realistic grading. What is
far from clear is whether these aggregation rules will perform equally well for the whole population of
the students in our home institution. To see the importance of this question, imagine it in the planetary
scale that MOOCs envision. Can we make safe predictions for huge student populations by sampling a
tiny fraction of them, building a noise model as we did in Section 4.1, and then selecting the optimal
type-ordering aggregation rules as we did in Section 4.2?
We give a positive answer to this question by considering Mallows and RUM grading scenarios. With
Mallows and RUM, we have the luxury of two well-dened noise models for the grading behaviour of a
huge student population which we have used in order to compute optimal type-ordering aggregation rules.
is information will be used only for assessing the approach presented in the following. Now, we will
pretend that no information about grading behaviour is available and all we can do is to apply (actually,
to simulate) eld experiments like the ones we presented in Section 4.1 on tiny fractions of the students
in order to come up with noise matrices. In this way, we will compute approximations of the true noise
models.
We have followed this approach using samples of Mallows and RUM graders of size 100 and 1000; recall
that we have used 109 samples to compute the actual Mallows and RUM noise model matrices. e noise
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model matrices we obtained are as follows:
P 100mallows =

0.59 0.19 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.01
0.19 0.44 0.18 0.09 0.04 0.06
0.10 0.19 0.43 0.19 0.07 0.02
0.05 0.05 0.15 0.45 0.19 0.11
0.06 0.10 0.09 0.14 0.46 0.15
0.01 0.03 0.08 0.05 0.18 0.65

and
P 1000mallows =

0.639 0.186 0.066 0.058 0.031 0.020
0.193 0.534 0.150 0.055 0.032 0.036
0.073 0.149 0.501 0.147 0.076 0.054
0.039 0.075 0.155 0.497 0.147 0.087
0.033 0.038 0.071 0.163 0.517 0.178
0.023 0.018 0.057 0.080 0.197 0.625

for the Mallows model, and
P 100rum =

0.49 0.19 0.08 0.06 0.11 0.07
0.22 0.36 0.25 0.05 0.04 0.08
0.09 0.12 0.31 0.22 0.14 0.12
0.04 0.11 0.23 0.35 0.13 0.14
0.08 0.12 0.08 0.20 0.37 0.15
0.08 0.10 0.05 0.12 0.21 0.44

and
P 1000rum =

0.506 0.154 0.080 0.095 0.075 0.090
0.156 0.401 0.186 0.093 0.084 0.080
0.088 0.163 0.385 0.173 0.107 0.084
0.088 0.110 0.159 0.374 0.183 0.086
0.076 0.088 0.100 0.190 0.386 0.160
0.086 0.084 0.090 0.075 0.165 0.500

for the RUM model. e matrices have been used to compute the optimal type-ordering aggregation rules
for the ve bivariate performance objectives using our theoretical framework from Sections 3.1 and 3.2.
Interestingly, the instances of FAS that we had to solve were slightly harder now. In particular, for
the 100-sample Mallows noise model and the 100-sample RUM noise model, we had strongly connected
components of size up to 26 and 89, respectively. Still, our methodology was applied smoothly and allowed
us to compute optimal rules. Recall that (see Sections 3.2 and 4.2) for strongly connected components of
size larger than 10, we use Borda orderings of the types within the component, instead of computing the
optimal ordering by brute forcing (which is prohibitive for so large components). Hence, an important
question is how close to optimality are the type-ordering aggregation rules that we come up with, when
we inevitably resort to Borda orderings. To answer this, we compute an upper bound on the performance
of the optimal rules by considering the maximum weight edge between any pair of types that are part of
a strongly connected component. Note that this gives an upper bound on the contribution of the strongly
connected components to the total weight of the optimal solution of the FAS instance since, in general,
taking the maximum weight edges may lead to cycles. en, we can see how close the performance of
our rules is to this upper bound. Table 4 contains this information; it should be clear from the almost zero
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model all2all acc-2% acc-5% th-10% th-50%
realistic 2015 0 0 0 0 0
realistic 2016 0 0 0 0 0
mallows 6 · 10−6 6 · 10−6 6 · 10−6 0 0
100-mallows 5 · 10−5 5 · 10−5 5 · 10−5 0 0
1000-mallows 0 8 · 10−6 1 · 10−5 0 0
rum 2 · 10−4 2 · 10−4 1 · 10−4 0 2 · 10−5
100-rum 1 · 10−4 2 · 10−4 7 · 10−4 0 0
1000-rum 6 · 10−4 6 · 10−4 2 · 10−4 0 1 · 10−5
Table 4: Upper bound error for all scenarios. e numbers depicted correspond to the dierence between
the performance of the respective type-ordering aggregation rule that is computed using Borda orderings
within the strongly connected components of size larger than 10 and the theoretical upper bound on the
performance of the optimal rule, which is computed by accounting for the maximum weight between any
two types that are part of a big strongly connected component. e value 0 indicates that there were no
such big components and the rule is actually optimal. As one can observe, even in cases where we did
have big components, the error is extremely close to 0.
values reported there that the type-ordering aggregation rules that we obtain are extremely close to being
optimal.
Table 5 shows the theoretical prediction values of the 100- and 1000-sample approximation type-
ordering aggregation rules. e performance of the type-ordering aggregation rules that were computed
using the 100-sample approximations are already amazingly close to those for the actual models. For the
rules that we computed using the 1000-sample approximation, it is almost impossible to distinguish them
from the actual ones, in terms of performance.
# samples 100 1000 109
seing mallows rum mallows rum mallows rum
all2all 84.95 77.51 85.14 77.85 85.15 77.89
th-10% 91.82 86.58 92.05 87.08 92.05 87.11
th-50% 88.21 80.84 88.39 81.25 88.39 81.27
acc-2% 86.31 78.59 86.51 78.95 86.52 78.99
acc-5% 88.19 80.21 88.41 80.51 88.42 80.57
Table 5: eoretical performance prediction of the optimal type-ordering aggregation rules for the 100-
and 1000-sample approximations of the Mallows and RUM model.
A more rened graphical representation of these ndings is given in Figure 5 (best viewed in color).
Each plot contains a blue and a red cloud of 1000 points, each corresponding to a single simulated exam
with 10 000 students. e blue points (respectively, red points) show the performance of the optimal rule
for the 1000-sample (respectively, 100-sample) Mallows and RUM approximation versus the Mallows- and
RUM-optimal rule in subgures (a)–(c) and (d)–(f), respectively. In all cases, the blue cloud almost coincides
with the diagonal in each plot, indicating an optimal approximation of the optimal rule. e red cloud is
distinct but still very close. To realize how close the two clouds are, for the case of the Mallows model,
almost the whole cloud of points for Borda (from Figures 3(g)–(i)) would be located outside the plot area
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of Figure 5(a)–(c) (if we aempted to plot it).
84.6 84.8 85 85.2 85.4 85.6
84.6
84.8
85
85.2
85.4
85.6
Mallows
Ap
pr
ox
im
at
io
n
(a) all2all, Mallows
91 91.2 91.4 91.6 91.8 92 92.2 92.4 92.6 92.8 93
91
91.2
91.4
91.6
91.8
92
92.2
92.4
92.6
92.8
93
Mallows
Ap
pr
ox
im
at
io
n
(b) th-10%, Mallows
87.8 88 88.2 88.4 88.6 88.8 89
87.8
88
88.2
88.4
88.6
88.8
89
Mallows
Ap
pr
ox
im
at
io
n
(c) acc-5%, Mallows
76.6 76.8 77 77.2 77.4 77.6 77.8 78 78.2 78.4 78.6
76.6
76.8
77
77.2
77.4
77.6
77.8
78
78.2
78.4
78.6
Random Utility Model
Ap
pr
ox
im
at
io
n
(d) all2all, RUM
85 85.5 86 86.5 87 87.5 88 88.5
85
85.5
86
86.5
87
87.5
88
88.5
Random Utility Model
Ap
pr
ox
im
at
io
n
(e) th-10%, RUM
79 79.5 80 80.5 81 81.5
79
79.5
80
80.5
81
81.5
Random Utility Model
Ap
pr
ox
im
at
io
n
(f) acc-5%, RUM
Figure 5: A comparison of the optimal rule for Mallows and RUM and their approximations with respect
to the objectives (a) all2all, (b) acc-5%, and (c) th-10%. e depicted results are from 1000 executions of the
type-ordering aggregation rules on simulated exams with 10 000 students.
We conclude the presentation of our simulation results with a comparison of the type orderings of
the optimal aggregation rules for Mallows and RUM and their 100- and 1000-sample approximations;
these are presented in Tables 6 and 7. erein, we can see that the optimal rules for the 1000-sample noise
models according to the all2all performance objective are very close (but not identical) to the Mallows- and
RUM-optimal rules. e optimal rules for the 100-sample noise models are substantially dierent (these
dierences are more apparent in lower positions of the orderings which cannot be included here). An
interesting characteristic of optimal rules for Mallows, RUM and their approximations is that the orderings
of types are non-monotonic. For example, type (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 5) is always ahead of (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2) for the
Mallows model and its approximations. is justies our decision to study type-ordering aggregation rules
and ignore positional scoring rules; clearly, no positional scoring rule would come up with non-monotonic
orderings of types.
5 Open problems and further research
In this paper, we have developed a theoretical framework for performance prediction and optimization
over a class of rank aggregation rules for ordinal peer grading in MOOCs. Our work reveals many chal-
lenging future research directions regarding ordinal peer grading and the deployment of our methods to
real MOOCs. An obvious rst direction is to develop an analogous framework for broader classes of ag-
gregation rules. is framework will be most useful if it allows for selecting the optimal aggregation rule
for a given scenario, as we have managed to do for type-ordering aggregation rules here.
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pos. mallows 100-sample 1000-sample
1 (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1) (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1) (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1)
2 (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 6) (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 5) (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 6)
3 (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 5) (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 5)
4 (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 4) (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2)
5 (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 4) (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 3) (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 4)
6 (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 3) (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 6) (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 3)
7 (1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 6) (1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2) (1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 6)
8 (1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2) (1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 5) (1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2)
9 (1, 1, 1, 1, 6, 6) (1, 1, 1, 1, 5, 5) (1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 5)
10 (1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 5) (1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 4) (1, 1, 1, 1, 6, 6)
11 (1, 1, 1, 1, 5, 6) (1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 3) (1, 1, 1, 1, 5, 6)
12 (1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 4) (1, 1, 1, 1, 3, 5) (1, 1, 1, 1, 5, 5)
13 (1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 3) (1, 1, 1, 1, 4, 5) (1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 4)
14 (1, 1, 1, 1, 5, 5) (1, 1, 1, 1, 3, 3) (1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 3)
Table 6: e rst 14 types in the type ordering of the optimal rules for Mallows and its 100-sample and
1000-sample approximations, according to the all2all performance objective.
In the deployment of ordinal peer grading in real MOOCs, a few professional graders may be actually
available; in technical terms, this implies a partial knowledge of the ground truth [Gao et al., 2016]. How
should this partial knowledge be combined with rank aggregation of students’ grading in order to get an
even beer nal ranking? is question seems to suggest nice extensions to our theory. Another issue that
we have completely neglected here is related to the common student drop out aer their participation in
an exam but before its grading. Even though we do not believe that such situations invalidate our methods,
such issues have to be taken seriously into account before deciding which rank aggregation rules to deploy
in real systems.
Finally, a thread of interesting research questions is related to incentives; e.g., see Kurokawa et al.
[2015] and Aziz et al. [2019]. Classical impossibilities in social choice theory imply that students may grade
strategically in order to improve their own position in the nal outcome. Can this strategic behaviour be
taken into account when deciding the optimal rank aggregation rule? Our approach might be possible to
adapt to strategic graders but this would require challenging technical work.
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A Computing the weights
We now elaborate on how to analytically compute the weight W (σ, σ′); the following computations are
implemented in Algorithm 1. Recall thatW (σ, σ′) is given by equation (6), i.e.,
W (σ, σ′) =
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
x
f(x, y) Pr[xB σ] · Pr[y B σ′] dy dx,
and that the performance objective bivariate function f indicates whether a correctly recovered pairwise
relation between two students x and y (with x < y) should be accounted for or not. All performance
objectives we consider in this paper can generically be described by such a function f with f(x, y) =
1 when x ∈ [α, β] and y ∈ [x + γ, δ] for appropriate values of α, β, γ, δ ∈ [0, 1], and f(x, y) = 0
otherwise. In particular, all2all can be expressed with the tuple (α, β, γ, δ) = (0, 1, 0, 1), th-10% and th-
50% with the tuples (0, 0.1, 0, 1) and (0, 0.5, 0, 1), and acc-2% and acc-5% with the tuples (0, 0.98, 0.02, 1)
and (0, 0.95, 0.05, 1).
en,W (σ, σ′) is equal to
W (σ, σ′) =
∫ β
α
∫ δ
x+γ
Pr[xB σ] · Pr[y B σ′] dy dx
=
∫ β
α
Pr[xB σ]
∫ δ
x+γ
Pr[y B σ′] dy dx. (13)
Now, recall that Pr[x B σ] is given by equation (5) and is a univariate polynomial of degree k2 − k.
Hence, it can be wrien as
Pr[xB σ] =
k2−k∑
s=0
cs(σ)x
s, (14)
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where the coecients cs(σ) with s = 0, ..., k2 − k are computed by equation (5), and have been included
for completeness in the rst part of Algorithm 1.
e inner integral in equation (13) is computed as follows:
∫ δ
x+γ
Pr[y B σ′] dy =
∫ δ
x+γ
k2−k∑
s=0
cs(σ
′)ys dy
=
k2−k∑
s=0
cs(σ
′)
∫ δ
x+γ
ys dy
=
k2−k∑
s=0
cs(σ
′)
s+ 1
(
δs+1 − (x+ γ)s+1)
=
k2−k∑
s=0
cs(σ
′)δs+1
s+ 1
−
k2−k+1∑
s=1
cs(σ
′)(x+ γ)s
s
.
Using the fact that (z + w)m =
∑m
i=0
(
m
i
)
zm−iwi for z = γ, w = x, andm = s, we obtain
∫ δ
x+γ
Pr[y B σ′] dy =
k2−k∑
s=0
cs(σ
′)δs+1
s+ 1
−
k2−k+1∑
s=1
cs(σ
′)
s∑
i=0
1
s
(
s
i
)
γs−ixi. (15)
Observe that the inner integral is also a univariate polynomial of degree k2 − k + 1 and it can be wrien
as ∫ δ
z+γ
Pr[y B σ′] dy =
k2−k+1∑
t=0
dt(σ)x
t, (16)
where the coecients dt(σ′) with t = 0, ..., k2 − k + 1 are computed by equation (15) at the second part
of Algorithm 1.
By substituting equations (14) and (16) in equation (13), we obtain
W (σ, σ′) =
∫ β
α
Pr[xB σ]
(∫ δ
x+γ
Pr[y B σ′] dy
)
dx
=
∫ β
α
k2−k∑
s=0
cs(σ)x
s
k2−k+1∑
t=0
dt(σ
′)xt dz
=
k2−k∑
s=0
k2−k+1∑
t=0
cs(σ)dt(σ
′)
∫ β
α
xs+t dz
=
k2−k∑
s=0
k2−k+1∑
t=0
cs(σ)dt(σ
′)
s+ t+ 1
(
βs+t+1 − αs+t+1
)
.
is computation is described in the last part of Algorithm 1.
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B Formal analysis of type-ordering aggregation rules
Our assumptions about innite number of students make our analysis in Section 3.1 non-rigorous. We
now present a rigorous analysis that handles formally all subtleties involved. We denote by n the number
of students and by k the bundle size.
In our non-rigorous analysis, exam papers are represented by their fractional true ranks in [0, 1]. Here,
as the number of exam papers is considered to be nite, we adjust this notation as follows. e integer
χ ∈ [n] will denote both an exam paper and its true rank (i.e., exam paper χ is the χ-th best paper in the
ground truth). For an exam paper χ and type σ ∈ Tk, we will use Prn[χ B σ] to denote the probability
that χ gets type σ. en, the notation Pr[xB σ] that is used in Section 3.1 can be thought of as the limit,
as n approaches innity, of the probability that exam paper χ (with x = χ/n) gets type σ.
Recall that for a type σ ∈ Tk, the quantityN(σ) denotes the number of dierent ways the graders can
give type σ to a given exam paper. It can be easily seen that N(σ) ≤ k!. e notation Lk is again used to
denote the set of all k-entry vectors ` = (`1, ..., `k) with `i ∈ [k]. We use the abbreviation |`|1 =
∑k
t=1 `t.
Finally, p is the noise matrix.
For a real z ∈ [0, 1], dene
θσ(z) = N(σ)
∑
`∈Lk
( k∏
i=1
pσi,`i
(
k − 1
`i − 1
))
z|`|1−k(1− z)k2−|`|1 .
Notice that θσ(x) is the equivalent expression (4) for Pr[x B σ] in our non-rigorous analysis. Clearly,
θσ(z) ≤ 1 for every z ∈ [0, 1].
Here, we will focus on exam paper χ ∈ [n] and will show that θσ(χ/n) is an approximation for
Prn[χ B σ], which becomes sharp as n approaches innity. is approximation is stated in Corollary 1,
which is obtained through the two next Lemmas 1 and 2.
We denote by ∆ the event that the exam papers that are contained in the k bundles in which χ appears
are all dierent. So, when ∆ is true, we can view the k(k−1) exam papers that appear in bundles together
with χ as selected uniformly at random without replacement among all exam papers besides χ.
Also, we denote by η(k) a suciently large quantity that depends only on k. Seing η(k) = kk2+2k+4
is enough for our proof below. Note that we have made no particular aempt to optimize η(k).
Lemma 1. For every exam paper χ ∈ [n] and type σ ∈ Tk, it holds that
|Prn[χB σ]− Prn[χB σ|∆]| ≤ η(k)/n.
Proof. Using the law of total probability, we have
Prn[χB σ] = Prn[χB σ|∆] · Prn[∆] + Prn[χB σ|∆] · Prn[∆]
= Prn[χB σ|∆] + Prn[∆] ·
(
Prn[χB σ|∆]− Prn[χB σ|∆]
)
,
which implies that
|Prn[χB σ]− Prn[χB σ|∆]| ≤ Prn[∆]. (17)
It remains to boundPrn[∆]. Consider the random process of forming the bundles (recall the discussion
in Section 2.1 and specically footnote 3). e process consists of k rounds. For i = 1, ..., k, the i-th exam
paper in each bundle is decided in round i. We denote by Bi the bundle that receives exam paper χ in
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round i. Without loss of generality, we assume that, in each round j, the j-th exam paper in the bundles
is decided as follows. By denition, if j = i, the j-th exam paper in bundle Bi is exam paper χ. If i 6= j,
the j-th exam paper in bundle Bi is selected uniformly at random among all exam papers besides exam
paper χ, the exam papers that have been included in bundle Bi in rounds 1, 2, …, j− 1, and the j-th exam
paper of bundles B1, B2, …, Bi−1. Hence, if i 6= j, the j-th exam paper in bundle Bi is selected uniformly
at random among n− i− j + 2 exam papers.
e number of distinct exam papers that have been included in bundles before deciding the j-th exam
paper of bundle Bi is (j − 1)(k − 1) + i if i < j and (j − 1)(k − 1) + i− 1 if i > j. Hence,
Prn[∆] =
k∏
j=1
j−1∏
i=1
n− (j − 1)(k − 1)− i
n− i− j + 2
k∏
i=j+1
n− (j − 1)(k − 1)− i+ 1
n− i− j + 2
≥
k∏
j=1
j−1∏
i=1
n− k2
n
k∏
i=j+1
n− k2
n
≥
(
1− k
2
n
)k2
≥ 1− k
4
n
≥ 1− η(k)/n.
e second last inequality follows by Bernoulli inequality. Hence,Prn[∆] ≤ η(k)/n and the lemma follows
due to inequality (17).
Lemma 2. For every exam paper χ ∈ [n] and type σ ∈ Tk, it holds that
|Prn[χB σ|∆]− θσ(χ/n)| ≤ η(k)/n.
Proof. LetB1,B2, …,Bk be the k bundles which contain exam paper χ. In order to compute Prn[χBσ|∆],
we will compute the probability that χ will be ranked σi-th in bundle Bi for i = 1, ..., k and, due to
symmetry, we will multiply by N(σ) in order to account for all possible dierent ways to get type σ.
We denote by Ei the event that exam paper χ is ranked σi-th by the grader of bundle Bi. For a vector
` = (`1, ..., `k) ∈ Lk, we denote by Zi the event that χ has true rank `i among the exam papers in bundle
Bi (i.e., χ is the `i-th best among the exam papers in bundle Bi). en,
Prn[χB σ|∆] = N(σ) · Prn[∩ki=1Ei|∆]
= N(σ) ·
∑
`∈Lk
Prn[∩ki=1Zi|∆] · Prn[∩ki=1Ei| ∩ki=1 Zi,∆]. (18)
Now, observe that
Prn[∩ki=1Ei| ∩ki=1 Zi,∆] =
k∏
i=1
Prn[Ei|Zi] =
k∏
i=1
pσi,`i (19)
by the denition of the noise matrix. Furthermore, using the chain rule,
Prn[∩ki=1Zi|∆] =
k∏
i=1
Prn[Zi|Z1, ...,Zi−1,∆]. (20)
Now, the conditions Z1, …, Zi−1 indicate that among the exam papers in bundlesB1, …, Bi−1, exactly∑i−1
t=1 `t − i + 1 have beer true rank than χ and exactly k(i − 1) −
∑i−1
t=1 `t have worse true rank than
χ. Assuming ∆ and Z1, …, Zi−1, the k − 1 exam papers in bundle Bi (besides χ) are selected uniformly
at random without replacement between all exam papers that have not been included in bundles B1, …,
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Bi−1. en, the probability that exactly `i−1 among the k−1 exam papers of bundleBi have beer rank
than exam paper χ is
Prn[Zi|Z1, ...,Zi−1,∆]
=
(
k − 1
`i − 1
) `i−1∏
j=1
χ+ i− j − 1−∑i−1t=1 `t
n− j − (k − 1)(i− 1)
k∏
j=`i+1
n+ 1− χ− (i− 1)k − j +∑i−1t=1 `t
n+ 1− (k − 1)(i− 1)− `i − j . (21)
We bound the fractions in the above expression using the property αβ ≤ α+γβ+γ when 0 ≤ α ≤ β and
γ > 0 and the facts that i, j, `i ∈ [k]. We have
χ+ i− j − 1−∑i−1t=1 `t
n− j − (k − 1)(i− 1) ≤
χ+ (i− 1)k −∑i−1t=1 `t
n
≤ min
{
1,
χ
n
+
k2
n
}
(22)
and
n+ 1− χ− (i− 1)k − j +∑i−1t=1 `t
n+ 1− (k − 1)(i− 1)− `i − j ≤
n− χ+∑it=1 `t
n
≤ min
{
1, 1− χ
n
+
k2
n
}
. (23)
Using equalities (20) and (21) and inequalities (22) and (23), we get
Prn[∩ki=1Zi|∆] ≤
k∏
i=1
(
k − 1
`i − 1
)(
min
{
1,
χ
n
+
k2
n
})`i−1(
min
{
1, 1− χ
n
+
k2
n
})k−`i
=
(
min
{
1,
χ
n
+
k2
n
})|`|1−k (
min
{
1, 1− χ
n
+
k2
n
})k2−|`|1 k∏
i=1
(
k − 1
`i − 1
)
. (24)
Using the variation of Bernoulli inequality, which states that (α+β)γ ≤ αγ+βγ whenα, β > 0, α+β ≤ 1,
and γ is a non-negative integer, we have(
min
{
1,
χ
n
+
k2
n
})|`|1−k (
min
{
1, 1− χ
n
+
k2
n
})k2−|`|1
≤ min
{
1,
(χ
n
)|`|1−k
+
k2
n
(|`|1 − k)
}
·min
{
1,
(
1− χ
n
)k2−|`|1
+
k2
n
(k2 − |`|1)
}
≤
(χ
n
)|`|1−k · (1− χ
n
)k2−|`|1
+
k4
n
. (25)
Puing (18), (19), (24), and (25) together and using the denition of θσ(χ/n), we obtain that
Prn[χB σ|∆] ≤ θσ(χ/n) + k
4
n
·N(σ)
∑
`∈Lk
k∏
i=1
(
k − 1
`i − 1
)
pσi,`i
≤ θσ(χ/n) + kk2+2k+4/n ≤ θσ(χ/n) + η(k)/n. (26)
Similarly, we bound the fractions in the RHS of (21) from below using the facts that i, j, `i ∈ [k]. We
have
χ+ i− j − 1−∑i−1t=1 `t
n− j − (k − 1)(i− 1) ≥
χ+ i− j − 1−∑i−1t=1 `t
n
≥ max
{
0,
χ
n
− k
2
n
}
(27)
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and
n+ 1− χ− (i− 1)k − j +∑i−1t=1 `t
n+ 1− (k − 1)(i− 1)− `i − j ≥
n+ 1− χ− (i− 1)k − j +∑i−1t=1 `t
n
≥ max
{
0, 1− χ
n
− k
2
n
}
.
(28)
Using equalities (20) and (21) and inequalities (27) and (28), we get
Prn[∩ki=1Zi|∆] ≥
k∏
i=1
(
k − 1
`i − 1
)(
max
{
0,
χ
n
− k
2
n
})`i−1(
max
{
0, 1− χ
n
− k
2
n
})k−`i
=
(
max
{
0,
χ
n
− k
2
n
})|`|1−k (
max
{
0, 1− χ
n
− k
2
n
})k2−|`|1 k∏
i=1
(
k − 1
`i − 1
)
. (29)
Using the variation of Bernoulli inequality, which states that (α−β)γ ≥ αγ−βγ whenα, β > 0, α−β ≥ 0,
and γ is a non-negative integer, we have(
max
{
0,
χ
n
− k
2
n
})|`|1−k (
max
{
0, 1− χ
n
− k
2
n
})k2−|`|1
≥ max
{
0,
(χ
n
)|`|1−k − k2
n
(|`|1 − k)
}
·max
{
0,
(
1− χ
n
)k2−|`|1 − k2
n
(k2 − |`|1)
}
≥
(χ
n
)|`|1−k · (1− χ
n
)k2−|`|1 − k4
n
. (30)
Puing (18), (19), (29), and (30) together and using the denition of θσ(χ/n), we obtain that
Prn[χB σ|∆] ≥ θσ(χ/n)− k
4
n
·N(σ)
∑
`∈Lk
k∏
i=1
(
k − 1
`i − 1
)
pσi,`i
≥ θσ(χ/n)− kk2+2k+4/n ≥ θσ(χ/n)− η(k)/n. (31)
e lemma follows by inequalities (26) and (31).
Lemmas 1 and 2 imply the following.
Corollary 1. For every exam paper χ ∈ [n] and type σ ∈ Tk, it holds that
|Prn[χB σ]− θσ(χ/n)| ≤ 2η(k)/n.
We next focus on two exam papers χ, υ ∈ [n]. We will show that the events that they get types
σ, σ′ ∈ Tk are almost independent.
Lemma 3. For every pair of exam papers χ, υ ∈ [n] and pair of types σ, σ′ ∈ Tk, it holds that
|Prn[χB σ and υ B σ′]− Prn[χB σ] · Prn[υ B σ′]| ≤ η(k)/n.
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Proof. Consider the two exam papers χ and υ and let Γ denote the event that no bundle contains both χ
and υ. Using Bayes’ rule and the law of total probability, we have
Prn[χB σ and υ B σ′]
= Prn[χB σ] · Prn[υ B σ′|χB σ]
= Prn[χB σ] ·
(
Prn[υ B σ′|χB σ,Γ]Prn[Γ] + Prn[υ B σ′|χB σ,Γ]Prn[Γ]
)
= Prn[χB σ] ·
(
Prn[υ B σ′|Γ]Prn[Γ] + Prn[υ B σ′|χB σ,Γ]Prn[Γ]
)
= Prn[χB σ] · Prn[υ B σ′] + Prn[Γ] · Prn[χB σ] ·
(
Prn[υ B σ′|χB σ,Γ]− Prn[υ B σ′|Γ]
)
.
In the third equality, we have used the fact that, whether exam paper υ gets type σ′ does not depend on
whether exam paper χ gets type σ when no bundle contains both χ and υ, i.e., Prn[υ B σ′|χ B σ,Γ] =
Prn[υ B σ′|Γ]. Hence,
|Prn[χB σ and υ B σ′]− Prn[χB σ] · Prn[υ B σ′]| ≤ Pr[Γ].
It remains to show that Pr[Γ] ≤ η(k)/n. Let t ∈ {k, k+ 1, ..., k(k−1)} be the random variable indicating
the number of papers dierent than χ which appear in the bundles of χ. Given t, the probability that
paper υ is one of these papers is Prn[Γ|t] = tn−1 ≤ η(k)n . Hence, Prn[Γ] ≤ η(k)/n as well and the lemma
follows.
Now, we use Cn to denote the expected fraction of pairwise relations between exam papers that are
recovered correctly by the type-ordering aggregation rule . Using Lemma 3 and Corollary 1, we have
Cn =
(
n
2
)−1 n−1∑
χ=1
n∑
υ=χ+1
 ∑
σ,σ′:σσ′
Prn[χB σ and υ B σ′] +
1
2
∑
σ
Prn[χB σ and υ B σ]

≤
(
n
2
)−1 n−1∑
χ=1
n∑
υ=χ+1
 ∑
σ,σ′:σσ′
(
Prn[χB σ] · Prn[υ B σ′] + η(k)
n
)
+
1
2
∑
σ
(
Prn[χB σ] · Prn[υ B σ] + η(k)
n
))
≤
(
n
2
)−1 n−1∑
χ=1
n∑
υ=χ+1
 ∑
σ,σ′:σσ′
(
θσ(χ/n) · θσ′(υ/n) + 5η(k)
n
)
+
1
2
∑
σ
(
θσ(χ/n) · θσ(υ/n) + 5η(k)
n
)
=
(
n
2
)−1 n−1∑
χ=1
n∑
υ=χ+1
 ∑
σ,σ′:σσ′
θσ(χ/n) · θσ′(υ/n) + 1
2
∑
σ
θσ(χ/n) · θσ(υ/n)
+ 5|Tk|2η(k)
2n
.
In the second inequality, besides Corollary 1, we have also used the fact that θσ(χ/n) and θσ′(υ/n) are at
most 1.
Similarly, we can obtain the following lower bound:
Cn ≥
(
n
2
)−1 n−1∑
χ=1
n∑
υ=χ+1
 ∑
σ,σ′:σσ′
θσ(χ/n) · θσ′(υ/n) + 1
2
∑
σ
θσ(χ/n) · θσ(υ/n)
− 5|Tk|2η(k)
2n
.
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So far, we have shown that Cn takes values that range in an interval of width 5|Tk|2η(k)/n. We remark
that our experiments indicate that the concentration is much sharper.
Notice that the quantity 5|Tk|
2η(k)
2n , which appears in the above upper and lower bounds of Cn, ap-
proaches 0 as n tends to innity, as both |Tk| and η(k) depend only on k. Hence,
lim
n→+∞Cn =
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
x
 ∑
σ,σ′:σσ′
θσ(x) · θσ′(y) + 1
2
∑
σ
θσ(x) · θσ(y)
 dy dx
=
∑
σ,σ′:σσ′
W (σ, σ′) +
1
2
∑
σ
W (σ, σ),
where the weightsW are exactly as we have dened them in Section 3.1. We conclude that the quantity C
that we study in our non-rigorous analysis is indeed the limit of the expected number of correctly recovered
pairwise relations as the number of students approaches innity. Extending the analysis for more general
bivariate performance objectives f (as we did in Section 3.2) is straightforward.
C Experimental data
e following tables contain the data collected from our two eld experiments. Information for each
student consists of an identier, a half-integer quality (the cardinal grade of the student in the mid term
exam) and the ranking provided by the student for the six exam papers in her bundle (assuming that the
correct ranking is 1 2 3 4 5 6). Table 8 contains the data collected in the 2015 eld experiment. Due to the
larger number of participating students, the data from the 2016 eld experiment have been split into the
two Tables 9 and 10.
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Algorithm 1: ComputingW (σ, σ′)
// Compute the coefficient vector c(σ)
for s := 0 . . . k2 − k do
set cs(σ) := 0
end
for `1 := 1 . . . k do
. . .
for `k := 1 . . . k do
set |`|1 :=
∑k
i=1 `i
for j := 0 . . . k2 − |`|1 do
set c|`|1−k+j(σ) := c|`|1−k+j(σ) +N(σ)
(∏k
i=1 pσi,`i
(
k−1
`i−1
))(
k2−|`|1
j
)
(−1)j
end
end
end
// Compute the coefficient vector d(σ′)
set d0(σ′) :=
∑k2−k
s=0
cs(σ′)δs+1
s+1
for t := 1 . . . k2 − k + 1 do
set dt(σ′) := 0
end
for s := 1 . . . k2 − k + 1 do
for i := 0 . . . s do
set di(σ′) := di(σ′)− cs(σ
′)
s
(
s
i
)
γs−i
end
end
// Compute W (σ, σ′)
setW (σ, σ′) := 0
for s := 0 . . . k2 − k do
for t := 0 . . . k2 − k + 1 do
setW (σ, σ′) := W (σ, σ′) + cs(σ)dt(σ
′)
s+t+1
(
βs+t+1 − αs+t+1)
end
end
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# qual. ranking # qual. ranking # qual. ranking # qual. ranking
1 10 2 1 3 4 5 6 35 7 1 3 2 6 4 5 69 5 5 6 4 1 2 3 103 3.5 2 1 3 4 5 6
2 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 36 7 6 5 3 4 1 2 70 5 4 5 2 1 3 6 104 3.5 1 2 4 3 5 6
3 9.5 1 3 2 4 5 6 37 6.5 1 2 5 3 4 6 71 5 2 1 3 4 5 6 105 3.5 4 2 3 6 5 1
4 9.5 1 2 5 4 3 6 38 6.5 2 1 5 3 4 6 72 5 1 3 2 4 5 6 106 3 4 1 2 5 3 6
5 9 1 3 2 5 4 6 39 6.5 1 2 6 3 4 5 73 5 2 1 5 3 4 6 107 3 4 1 3 2 6 5
6 9 3 1 2 5 4 6 40 6.5 1 2 3 4 5 6 74 4.5 1 3 4 2 5 6 108 3 2 3 4 6 5 1
7 9 2 6 5 4 3 1 41 6 1 4 2 3 5 6 75 4.5 1 2 3 5 4 6 109 3 3 4 5 1 2 6
8 8.5 3 2 1 4 5 6 42 6 1 2 3 5 6 4 76 4.5 1 5 2 3 4 6 110 3 3 1 5 6 4 2
9 8 3 4 2 5 1 6 43 6 2 1 5 3 4 6 77 4.5 1 4 3 2 5 6 111 3 1 3 2 6 4 5
10 8 1 3 2 4 5 6 44 6 5 1 2 4 3 6 78 4.5 3 1 2 5 4 6 112 2.5 2 1 5 3 4 6
11 8 3 1 2 4 5 6 45 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 79 4.5 2 4 1 3 6 5 113 2.5 3 4 6 1 2 5
12 8 1 5 6 2 3 4 46 6 1 4 2 3 6 5 80 4.5 3 4 1 5 2 6 114 2.5 1 2 4 3 6 5
13 8 5 3 4 6 2 1 47 6 1 5 2 3 4 6 81 4.5 1 2 6 4 5 3 115 2.5 1 2 4 5 3 6
14 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 48 6 1 2 3 6 5 4 82 4.5 2 3 1 5 4 6 116 2.5 1 5 2 6 3 4
15 8 1 2 3 5 4 6 49 6 1 2 5 6 4 3 83 4.5 3 1 4 2 6 5 117 2.5 1 3 4 2 5 6
16 8 1 4 3 6 2 5 50 6 3 6 1 2 4 5 84 4.5 3 2 1 5 4 6 118 2.5 1 3 2 6 4 5
17 8 4 2 3 5 1 6 51 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 85 4.5 3 1 4 2 6 5 119 2.5 3 1 4 6 5 2
18 8 3 2 4 5 6 1 52 5.5 1 2 3 4 5 6 86 4.5 4 1 2 6 3 5 120 2.5 4 2 3 1 6 5
19 7.5 1 2 3 6 4 5 53 5.5 4 2 1 3 5 6 87 4.5 4 2 3 5 1 6 121 2 1 3 4 2 5 6
20 7.5 1 2 6 5 4 3 54 5.5 3 1 5 4 6 2 88 4 1 4 5 2 3 6 122 2 1 3 2 4 5 6
21 7.5 1 3 6 5 4 2 55 5.5 4 1 3 6 5 2 89 4 1 2 6 5 3 4 123 2 2 1 4 5 3 6
22 7.5 3 5 4 1 2 6 56 5.5 1 6 2 5 4 3 90 4 3 1 4 6 5 2 124 2 2 1 4 5 3 6
23 7.5 1 2 6 3 4 5 57 5.5 1 2 4 5 3 6 91 4 1 3 2 4 5 6 125 2 3 4 1 2 6 5
24 7.5 1 3 2 5 4 6 58 5.5 6 3 4 2 1 5 92 4 4 6 1 5 2 3 126 2 2 3 1 4 6 5
25 7.5 2 3 5 4 6 1 59 5.5 1 6 5 3 4 2 93 4 1 2 3 4 5 6 127 2 3 2 5 4 1 6
26 7 1 2 3 5 6 4 60 5.5 4 5 2 1 3 6 94 4 2 4 5 3 6 1 128 1.5 1 3 2 4 5 6
27 7 1 3 2 5 4 6 61 5.5 1 4 5 6 3 2 95 3.5 2 1 4 3 5 6 129 1.5 1 2 6 3 4 5
28 7 1 2 6 3 4 5 62 5 1 2 4 3 5 6 96 3.5 2 1 3 4 6 5 130 1.5 2 4 3 1 5 6
29 7 2 1 5 3 6 4 63 5 2 1 3 4 6 5 97 3.5 1 4 2 3 5 6 131 1.5 5 2 4 3 1 6
30 7 2 1 3 4 5 6 64 5 2 1 4 3 5 6 98 3.5 2 1 3 5 4 6 132 1 1 2 6 5 3 4
31 7 1 2 3 6 4 5 65 5 2 1 3 4 6 5 99 3.5 4 1 3 2 6 5 133 1 5 6 3 2 4 1
32 7 2 3 1 5 4 6 66 5 1 2 3 6 4 5 100 3.5 1 5 4 3 2 6 134 0.5 3 1 2 4 5 6
33 7 1 2 4 6 3 5 67 5 4 1 2 3 5 6 101 3.5 5 1 4 2 6 3 135 0.5 3 4 5 6 1 2
34 7 2 3 1 5 4 6 68 5 1 3 2 6 5 4 102 3.5 6 2 1 3 4 5 136 0 2 3 1 4 6 5
Table 8: e data collected in our 2015 eld experiment (with 136 students). Each quality/ranking pair
corresponds to a student. ality takes half-integer values between 0 and 10. e ranking 1 2 3 4 5 6 is
the correct one. Hence, in the ranking 2 1 3 4 5 6 provided by the rst student, all pairwise relations are
correct besides the one involving the best and the second best exam papers in the bundle of the student.
From these rankings, we can compute the probability pi,j for each i ∈ [6], j ∈ [6] by counting the number
of times j appears i-th in the rankings provided by all students, and then dividing by the total number of
students that participated in the eld experiment. For example, since 2 appears 28 times rst, we have that
p2,1 = 28/136 ≈ 0.2059; see the noise matrix P2015, given by (9).
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# qual. ranking # qual. ranking # qual. ranking # qual. ranking
1 10 1 2 3 5 6 4 31 8.5 3 2 5 4 1 6 61 7 1 3 2 4 5 6 91 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
2 10 1 3 2 4 5 6 32 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 62 7 1 2 3 6 4 5 92 6 2 5 6 3 4 1
3 10 1 2 3 6 5 4 33 8 1 4 5 2 3 6 63 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 93 6 1 2 5 3 4 6
4 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 34 8 3 1 2 5 4 6 64 7 5 1 2 6 4 3 94 6 1 3 6 5 2 4
5 10 2 1 3 4 5 6 35 8 1 3 4 2 5 6 65 7 1 4 3 2 5 6 95 6 2 1 3 4 5 6
6 10 1 6 2 4 5 3 36 8 1 5 3 4 2 6 66 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 96 6 1 3 2 4 5 6
7 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 37 8 3 1 2 4 5 6 67 7 1 2 3 4 6 5 97 6 4 1 5 2 3 6
8 9.5 1 2 4 3 6 5 38 8 1 2 4 3 5 6 68 7 1 2 4 6 3 5 98 6 1 2 4 3 5 6
9 9.5 6 4 5 3 1 2 39 8 2 1 3 4 5 6 69 6.5 2 1 4 3 6 5 99 6 3 1 4 2 5 6
10 9.5 1 2 3 5 4 6 40 8 3 2 1 5 4 6 70 6.5 2 4 1 3 5 6 100 6 1 2 3 5 4 6
11 9.5 1 2 5 3 4 6 41 8 5 2 3 4 1 6 71 6.5 1 3 5 2 4 6 101 6 2 1 5 3 6 4
12 9 4 5 2 1 3 6 42 8 1 3 2 4 5 6 72 6.5 5 2 1 3 6 4 102 6 1 4 2 3 5 6
13 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 43 7.5 2 1 3 5 4 6 73 6.5 1 4 3 2 5 6 103 6 1 2 5 3 4 6
14 9 1 2 3 5 6 4 44 7.5 1 2 3 4 5 6 74 6.5 1 2 3 5 4 6 104 6 2 1 3 5 4 6
15 9 1 2 3 4 6 5 45 7.5 1 3 6 5 4 2 75 6.5 1 2 3 4 6 5 105 6 1 2 4 3 5 6
16 9 2 1 3 6 4 5 46 7.5 4 1 2 5 6 3 76 6.5 1 2 3 4 5 6 106 6 4 5 6 2 3 1
17 9 5 4 1 3 2 6 47 7.5 3 1 2 4 5 6 77 6.5 1 2 5 4 6 3 107 5.5 6 4 2 5 3 1
18 9 5 1 2 4 3 6 48 7.5 1 2 3 4 5 6 78 6.5 1 2 3 4 5 6 108 5.5 2 1 3 4 5 6
19 9 3 1 2 4 6 5 49 7.5 1 3 2 4 5 6 79 6.5 1 3 2 4 5 6 109 5.5 1 3 2 4 5 6
20 9 2 3 4 1 6 5 50 7.5 1 2 3 4 5 6 80 6.5 1 2 5 3 4 6 110 5.5 1 3 2 4 5 6
21 8.5 1 2 3 4 6 5 51 7.5 1 2 3 5 6 4 81 6.5 2 1 3 6 4 5 111 5.5 4 1 2 3 5 6
22 8.5 2 4 3 1 5 6 52 7.5 2 1 3 6 4 5 82 6 1 4 3 2 5 6 112 5.5 1 2 3 4 5 6
23 8.5 2 3 1 4 5 6 53 7.5 1 2 3 4 5 6 83 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 113 5.5 2 3 1 4 6 5
24 8.5 1 2 3 4 5 6 54 7.5 1 2 4 5 3 6 84 6 1 3 2 5 4 6 114 5.5 2 1 3 5 4 6
25 8.5 2 1 4 3 6 5 55 7.5 1 2 3 6 4 5 85 6 3 1 4 2 5 6 115 5.5 1 2 3 4 6 5
26 8.5 2 3 1 4 5 6 56 7.5 1 2 4 3 5 6 86 6 1 2 3 5 4 6 116 5.5 3 2 1 6 4 5
27 8.5 2 5 3 1 4 6 57 7.5 2 3 1 4 6 5 87 6 1 5 4 2 3 6 117 5.5 3 1 2 5 4 6
28 8.5 1 3 5 2 4 6 58 7 2 1 4 3 6 5 88 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 118 5.5 1 2 3 4 6 5
29 8.5 4 1 3 2 5 6 59 7 2 1 3 4 5 6 89 6 1 5 2 6 4 3 119 5.5 1 2 5 3 6 4
30 8.5 1 4 3 2 5 6 60 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 90 6 5 1 2 3 4 6 120 5.5 3 2 1 4 5 6
Table 9: e data collected in our 2016 eld experiment (the table contains data for 120 out of 241 students).
Each quality/ranking pair corresponds to a student. ality takes half-integer values between 0 and 10.
e ranking 1 2 3 4 5 6 is the correct one.
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# qual. ranking # qual. ranking # qual. ranking # qual. ranking
121 5.5 4 2 3 1 5 6 152 5 1 2 3 4 5 6 182 4 1 2 3 5 6 4 212 3 1 5 2 4 3 6
122 5.5 1 3 4 2 6 5 153 4.5 1 4 3 2 5 6 183 4 1 2 3 5 4 6 213 2.5 1 2 3 4 5 6
123 5.5 1 3 2 5 4 6 154 4.5 1 2 3 4 5 6 184 4 1 2 4 3 5 6 214 2.5 1 2 3 6 5 4
124 5.5 1 2 3 4 5 6 155 4.5 1 2 4 3 5 6 185 3.5 1 2 3 5 4 6 215 2.5 1 3 2 5 4 6
125 5.5 1 2 3 4 6 5 156 4.5 4 2 1 3 5 6 186 3.5 1 2 3 4 5 6 216 2.5 3 2 4 1 5 6
126 5.5 5 1 2 3 4 6 157 4.5 1 2 6 4 3 5 187 3.5 1 2 4 3 5 6 217 2.5 1 2 4 3 5 6
127 5.5 1 2 6 5 3 4 158 4.5 4 1 2 3 5 6 188 3.5 5 1 4 2 3 6 218 2.5 1 2 3 4 5 6
128 5.5 2 1 4 3 5 6 159 4.5 1 4 2 3 5 6 189 3.5 1 3 2 4 5 6 219 2.5 4 2 1 3 5 6
129 5 1 3 2 4 5 6 160 4.5 4 1 2 3 6 5 190 3.5 1 2 4 5 6 3 220 2.5 1 2 3 5 4 6
130 5 3 1 2 4 5 6 161 4.5 2 4 5 1 3 6 191 3.5 2 1 3 6 5 4 221 2.5 1 2 3 4 6 5
131 5 1 2 3 4 6 5 162 4.5 6 3 5 4 2 1 192 3.5 1 3 2 4 5 6 222 2.5 2 1 3 4 5 6
132 5 1 2 5 3 4 6 163 4.5 3 1 2 5 4 6 193 3.5 4 2 3 1 5 6 223 2.5 1 5 3 2 4 6
133 5 1 2 3 4 5 6 164 4.5 1 2 3 4 5 6 194 3.5 1 2 5 3 4 6 224 2 1 6 3 4 2 5
134 5 1 3 2 4 5 6 165 4.5 1 2 3 5 6 4 195 3.5 1 5 6 3 4 2 225 2 1 2 3 5 4 6
135 5 5 1 2 4 3 6 166 4.5 1 2 5 3 4 6 196 3.5 1 2 4 3 6 5 226 2 1 2 5 4 6 3
136 5 4 1 2 3 5 6 167 4.5 1 2 3 4 5 6 197 3.5 4 2 1 3 5 6 227 2 2 1 3 5 6 4
137 5 1 2 3 4 5 6 168 4.5 1 2 4 5 3 6 198 3.5 1 3 2 4 5 6 228 2 1 2 3 4 5 6
138 5 1 2 3 4 6 5 169 4.5 1 2 3 4 5 6 199 3.5 1 3 2 4 5 6 229 2 4 1 5 2 6 3
139 5 1 2 3 4 6 5 170 4.5 2 3 1 4 5 6 200 3.5 2 1 3 4 5 6 230 2 1 6 5 2 4 3
140 5 2 1 4 3 5 6 171 4.5 1 2 3 5 4 6 201 3.5 1 2 3 5 4 6 231 2 6 2 5 3 4 1
141 5 1 3 4 2 5 6 172 4.5 2 1 3 4 5 6 202 3.5 2 1 3 5 6 4 232 2 1 4 6 2 3 5
142 5 1 2 4 3 6 5 173 4.5 2 1 3 4 5 6 203 3.5 1 2 4 3 5 6 233 1.5 1 2 3 4 5 6
143 5 5 3 1 2 6 4 174 4.5 1 2 3 4 5 6 204 3 3 1 2 4 5 6 234 1.5 5 6 3 4 2 1
144 5 1 2 3 4 5 6 175 4 1 2 4 3 5 6 205 3 2 1 3 4 6 5 235 1.5 1 2 3 6 4 5
145 5 2 5 1 3 6 4 176 4 3 1 2 4 5 6 206 3 1 2 4 3 6 5 236 1.5 1 2 3 4 5 6
146 5 1 2 3 4 5 6 177 4 1 2 3 6 5 4 207 3 1 6 3 2 5 4 237 1 2 1 3 6 4 5
147 5 4 5 3 2 6 1 178 4 1 2 3 4 5 6 208 3 1 3 2 5 4 6 238 1 2 3 1 5 6 4
148 5 2 3 1 4 6 5 179 4 1 2 3 5 4 6 209 3 2 1 6 4 3 5 239 1 1 2 3 4 5 6
149 5 2 3 4 1 5 6 180 4 1 2 3 4 5 6 210 3 1 2 4 3 5 6 240 0.5 1 4 2 6 3 5
150 5 1 2 3 4 6 5 181 4 1 2 3 4 6 5 211 3 1 2 3 4 6 5 241 0.5 2 6 1 5 4 3
151 5 2 1 3 4 5 6
Table 10: e data collected in our 2016 eld experiment (the table contains data for the remaining 121
out of 241 students).
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